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Piracy represents a serious threat to modern maritime traffic, causing significant financial 
losses as well as loss of life. The system’s proposed area of operation is the waters of 
Indonesia, as current antipiracy solutions are not feasible due to the region’s unique 
physical geography. Worldwide deployment is possible with minimal modifications. The 
systems engineering process was used to identify a system that effectively and 
economically prevents pirates from boarding commercial vessels. A model of the 
operational environment was developed in MATLAB to run simulations designed to 
estimate the relative effectiveness of each assessed countermeasure. A cost analysis was 
performed on the most effective system configurations to determine economic feasibility; 
the best-value system was recommended. The results of the project indicated that the P-
Trap countermeasure, designed to entangle the pirate’s propellers with thin lines, is both 
effective and economically viable for wide-scale deployment. The further addition of a 
fire hose system using net projectiles to increase the difficulty of boarders to climb onto 
the vessel was found to enhance the system effectiveness, while remaining cost-effective. 
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Maritime piracy is often thought of as a historical problem, but it is a significant 
contemporary threat to international commerce. Pirates are able to capture cargo ships 
and tankers worth millions of dollars and ransom the ship and its crew back to the home 
nation. While naval deployments have successfully controlled hotspots of pirate activity 
such as Somalia, this stratagem is not universally effective. Pirates in the seas around 
Indonesia are able to use local geography to reduce the effectiveness of naval task forces. 
In part due to this, piracy in Indonesian waters has surged to nearly half of all reported 
pirate attacks in recent years. This report focuses on the identification of a solution that 
will prevent pirates from boarding commercial shipping vessels. 
This project involves a wide range of stakeholders interested in some aspect of the 
system. Merchant crews, shipping companies, and international maritime organizations 
were identified as key stakeholders. Inputs were obtained from the key stakeholders, and 
were used to generate system requirements. The analysis of top-level user requirements 
showed that the system could be considered successful in deterring piracy if pirate 
boarding is prevented for the period of time required for aid to arrive. Pirate deterrence 
can be accomplished by the second level requirements of impeding pirate entry routes, 
forcing pirates away from the target merchant vessel, or degrading pirate capabilities.  
Research of the current and theorized pirate countermeasures used to deter or 
prevent boarding resulted in a comprehensive database of twenty-five (25) 
countermeasures. The list of countermeasures was reduced by rating each item on 
Measures of Performance (MoP) and Measures of Suitability (MoS) such as Time to 
Deploy, Ease of Use, Maintenance, Cost, and Logistics. The results indicated that the five 
countermeasures should be modeled to determine effectiveness: Razor Wire, P-Traps, 
Water Curtains, Fire-hoses, and Compressed Air Cannons. 
A model of the operational environment was coded using MATLAB that utilizes a 
predator-prey relationship to represent the pirate vessels and the commercial ship. The 
model assumed that multiple hostile vessels would engage in an attack, with the intent to 
 xvi 
overrun the target’s defenses. For each countermeasure configuration a functional flow of 
events versus a simulated pirate attack was performed using MATLAB software. System 
configurations were developed to estimate the relative effectiveness of each 
configuration, as well as the cumulative effects of employing multiple countermeasures 
simultaneously. 
Twenty-four system configurations were selected out of thirty-two possible by 
filtering out the eight system configurations in which neither of the passive defense 
countermeasures was used; utilizing only complex, active countermeasures would 
unnecessarily increase both manpower requirements and cost, and would be rejected as 
gold-plating. Each system configuration was modeled using MATLAB and a simulation 
of a pirate attack on a commercial vessel was run 1,000 times for each modeled system 
configuration to determine the system configuration most effective at preventing pirate 
capture of the commercial vessel. A cost analysis of each system configuration was also 
performed, and used to determine the overall desirability of the system configuration. 
The results of the simulations and cost analyses showed three configurations that 
maximized cost-effectiveness. Usage of the P-Trap countermeasure combined with the 
Compressed Air Cannon provided a success rate of 97.3% with a five-year cost of 
$1.164M/ship. A slightly more effective system configuration consists of the P-Trap 
countermeasure combined with the Fire Hose, with a success rate of 99.4% and a five 
year cost of $1.341M/ship. Adding the Anti-Piracy Curtain to the P-Trap and Fire Hose 
countermeasures improves the success rate to 99.7%, but increased the system cost to a 
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Modern-day piracy presents a difficult and expensive problem for international 
trade, driving up shipping costs and placing merchant crews in peril. According to Peter 
Chalk in his analysis of maritime security for the RAND Corporation, pirates board and 
capture maritime traffic ranging from small luxury yachts to fully loaded supercargo 
ships carrying multi-million dollar cargoes (Chalk 2008). High-profile incidents where 
cargo, ship, and crew are held for ransom have made international news and have been 
dramatized in film, such as the 2013 action-thriller movie, Captain Philips. Far more 
numerous are incidents of mere thievery, where valuables and cargo are stolen under 
threat of force or stealthily, under the cover of darkness. The financial costs incurred 
from these criminal acts significantly increase shipping costs due to higher insurance 
premiums, increased transportation costs due to longer trade routes bypassing piracy 
prone areas, and loss of operation of attacked ships. As noted in Hellenic Shipping News, 
the economic effects of piracy cost the worldwide economy an estimated $6B in 2012 
(Hellenic 2014). 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a department of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), has published an annual report for the last two decades 
detailing maritime piracy. According to the report detailing 2013 incidents, Southeast 
Asia accounts for almost half of the total worldwide pirate attacks, while Africa accounts 
for 30% of the total incidents. The results from these studies (Table 1) show that 
Indonesia is an obvious area to target for an anti-piracy system or program, as over 48% 
of piracy-related incidents occurred in Indonesian sovereign waters and since Southeast 









Table 1. Regions of Actual and Attempted Pirate Attacks Worldwide 2009–2013 
Adapted from ICC IMB 2013 annual report, this table shows reported 
pirate attacks in each region for the last five years, as well as each 
region’s percentage of global pirate attacks in 2013. 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
% of total 
Attacks in 
2013 
SE Asia 46 70 80 104 128 48.5% 
Africa 266 259 293 150 79 29.9% 
India 30 28 16 19 26 9.8% 
South America 37 40 25 17 18 6.8% 
Far East 23 44 23 7 13 4.9% 
Rest of World 8 4 2 0 0 0.0% 
              
Total Attacks 410 445 439 297 264   
To date, the most successful method for combatting the piracy problem has been 
naval patrols. The waters around the Horn of Africa were a hotspot for piracy in the early 
2000s, resulting in the United Nations Security Council assembling a twenty-five nation 
task force, known as Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), to combat the pirate threat. 
CTF-151 succeeded in reducing the number of piracy incidents in the affected region due 
to the Gulf of Aden’s geography, consisting of a long and narrow strait used by 
commercial traffic. The strait contained limited options for a pirate to evade a naval 
vessel and few areas suitable for a pirate headquarters. Unfortunately, this strategy is 
unlikely to prove effective in the burgeoning piracy hotspot of the Indonesia region. 
The deployment of naval forces in the Indonesia region would face difficulties 
beyond those seen in Somalia, as the physical geography significantly differs from the 
Gulf of Aden. Andrew Manners, a piracy analyst for the region, noted that the area to be 
patrolled is significantly larger, shipping traffic is much less concentrated, and thousands 
of islands and coastal mangrove swamps with relatively small waterways provide ample 
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opportunities for pirates to evade capture (Manners 2014). As such, the number of naval 
vessels required to effectively patrol the region would be a massive and expensive 
undertaking. In addition, a second large force of patrol boats would be required to pursue 
the pirates through shallow, swampy channels. Finally, the political and diplomatic 
considerations required for a large naval deployment in Indonesian waters are likely to be 
significant due the number of competing sovereign states. Therefore, a non-taskforce 
based solution is required to effectively combat piracy in this region. 
1. Piracy in Indonesian Waters 
Four conditions are required for piracy to thrive: a target-rich environment, a lack 
of strong government, weak or corrupt local law enforcement, and a high reward-to-risk 
ratio (Samatar 2014). Several areas near high-traffic shipping lanes, such as Southeast 
Asia and West Africa, fit the stated conditions and have become hotbeds for pirate 
activity (Ben-Ari 2013). Indonesia is a prime example of an environment perfectly suited 
to incubate piracy. As noted by Eric Frécon in his fieldwork amongst the communities of 
the Riau islands near Singapore, the local government is corrupt, and the local security 
forces lack the resources to deter piracy. Specifically, he notes that in the coastal 
community of Kampung Hitam, “the police only have at their disposal small sampans 
with only one outboard motor, when, in comparison, pirates often have two or three. 
often shabbily dressed without proper uniforms, the policemen spend their time 
idling…rather than clamping down upon pirate activities.” (Ong-Webb 2006, 73). While 
improvements could be made to strengthen local forces, such efforts are not likely to 
yield results swiftly or cheaply. 
In order to better characterize the vessels involved in a typical pirate attack, a 
gross tonnage (GT) analysis was performed for both local maritime traffic and 
commercial vessels to determine typical scenario data. According to a 2012 report 
published by Equasis, commercial shipping vessels are categorized into four classes: 
small (under 500 GT), medium (between 500 GT to 25,000 GT), large (25,000 GT and 





vessels are classed as medium, while small vessels take a close second place with 36%. 
Large and very large vessels are considered less applicable for this study, comprising 
only 12% and 6%, respectively, of the total worldwide number of merchant vessels 
(Equasis 2012). Indonesian fishing vessels are significantly smaller than commercial 
merchant ships: out of roughly 300,000 registered fishing vessels, 40% are small (under 5 
GT), 24% fall between 5 and 10 GT, 18% fall between 10 and 30 GT, while 18% are 
above 30 GT (Lymer 2009).  
 The results of the GT analysis highlighted the disparate sizes of local vessels 
versus the commercial vessels, and were used to determine a baseline pirate attack 
scenario. Small and medium commercial shipping vessels represent 83% of the 
worldwide fleet. Because medium ships contain more enemy approach routes and thus a 
larger area to protect, they were used to define the typical targeted ship. The typical pirate 
vessel is more difficult to quantify due to the wide spread of GT, so a smaller size (5 GT) 
was chosen for inclusion in scenario design to maximize the boarding threat as smaller 
vessels are faster and more likely to be used in swarming attacks. 
Indonesian pirates use similar methods as those in other regions of the world, 
consisting primarily of pretending to be a fishing vessel until the target ship is close 
enough for an attempt to board (Allen 2013). Indonesia is currently the second largest 
producer of seafood worldwide (FAO 2014), so the pirates are able to easily blend in 
amongst genuine fishing vessels to avoid anti-piracy enforcement or alarming potential 
targets. Since most pirate vessels are repurposed fishing vessels, it is virtually impossible 
to obtain a positive identification of the pirate before an attack commences. A pirate can 
track, survey, and approach their targets with impunity, only revealing hostile intentions 
once close to a target. While the number of pirates in an attack can vary considerably, the 
weaponry used typically consists of small arms, knives, and grenades. Pirate attacks have 
ranged from a small number of people in a single boat to larger groups with multiple craft 






Pirates in this region are often successful once they begin an attack. Figure 1 
depicts high-traffic straits and all reported pirate attacks in Indonesian waters during 2013 
(ICC IMB 2013). Yellow pins represent attempted attacks, orange pins show a boarded 
ship, and red pins depict a hijacked ship. However, while the figure shows pirate attacks, 
it does not show how many ships traveled through this region safely and what the relative 
danger level is to estimate the probability of attack by pirates, a traffic analysis conducted 
by the U.S. Energy Information Administration of four large straits was analyzed and 
recorded in Table 2: the Strait of Malaccca, the Sunda Strait, and the combined Makassar 
and Lombok Straits (EIA 2012). The ships attacked in 2013 were divided by the total 
number of vessels to obtain the percentage of ships attacked. Additionally, the financial 
impact was estimated by determining the average worth of the cargo and multiplying it 
by the number of attacks to obtain the total dollar amount that could be seized by pirates. 
While the Straits of Malacca contained the most traffic and thus the most attacks, the 
combined Makassar and Lombok Straits had significantly higher attack rates and ship 
cargo worth. The results of the analysis indicate due to the low piracy prevention rate, a 
potential need for a new method of prevention exists in this region. However, the 
relatively low chance of pirate attacks shows that any solution must be cost-effective to 





Figure 1. 2013 Pirate Attacks in Indonesia 
Adapted from ICC Piracy Reporting Center 2013, this figure depicts pirate attacks in 
Southeast Asia during 2013. 
 
Table 2.  Analysis of Traffic, Cargo, and Danger in Indonesian Straits 
Adapted from Nanyang Technological University, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, and the Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, this table shows the percent of 


















60000 1300 55 0.09% $21.67  $1,191.67  
Makassar and 
Lombok Straits 
420 40 7 1.67% $95.24  $666.67  




The area around Singapore, shown in Figure 2, is the largest regional piracy 
hotspot, with the bulk of pirate attacks occurring on either side of the heavily travelled 
Singapore Strait. On the western outlet, a typical pirate attack involves a single wooden 
boat with no more than five pirates armed with long knives attacking a slow moving 
commercial vessel transiting out of the strait. In all of these attacks, the pirates stole 
mechanical parts and crew valuables but always fled after being spotted by the target 
ship’s crew. 
 
Figure 2. 2013 Pirate Attacks near Singapore 
Adapted from ICC Piracy Reporting Center, this figure depicts reported pirate attacks 
near Singapore in 2013. Many attacks near western Singapore waters consist of snatch-
and-grabs by a small number of pirates near a port. Attacks in eastern waters involve full 
speed chases and hijacking. 
The eastern outlet of the Singapore Strait and the shipping lanes feeding into it 
from the South China Sea are home to pirates with considerably better equipment, 
manpower, and coordination. A typical pirate attack involves multiple pirate craft with 
larger engines, capable of chasing down a commercial vessel travelling at full speed (21-
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25 knots) in open waters. The pirates manning these craft are more numerous and possess 
small arms as well as long knives. These pirates targeted isolated commercial vessels (at 
least an hour from any assistance) at twenty to fifty nautical miles from shore. Upon 
successfully boarding, merchant crews were always subdued and bound, the 
communication system of the target vessel was destroyed, and cargo transferred off to a 
pirate cargo vessel (typically a bunker ship). Usually the merchant crew and ship were 
released after the theft was completed, with the exception of a single incident where a tug 
was stolen and the crew set adrift on a barge. Because these pirates caused significantly 
more economic damage, further research was focused on the open waters pirates to 
discern the typical types of pirate attack in the region 
2. Pirate Attack Strategies  
According to Elleman, Forbes, and Rosenberg, pirate attacks near Indonesia 
employ a similar attack strategy. Each attack is typically conducted on a moving 
commercial ship, using the cover of darkness to avoid detection. Attacks typically fall 
between the hours of 0100 and 0600 to ensure that the majority of the crew is asleep. 
When the pirates are within range of the vessel, grappling hooks are used to board the 
target ship; the boarding party makes their way on to the vessel, and then subdues the 
lookouts. Once the pirates have boarded, they quickly make their way to the crew 
quarters to subdue the crew, pilfering any valuables encountered. Once the crew is 
neutralized, the pirates will employ one of three different strategies: cargo theft, 
kidnapping for the purpose of ransom, or seizure of the ship (Elleman, Forbes, and 
Rosenberg 2010). 
This first strategy, cargo theft, is the most common of the three. The pirates 
transfer part or all the of the ship’s cargo onto their own vessel(s), requiring from three to 
seven hours. Once the pirate ship is full of stolen goods, the pirates will release the crew 
and depart. 
The second possible strategy consists of attempting to extort a ransom from the 
crew’s employer by taking the crew hostage. Key crew members, such as the captain or 
pilot, are taken as hostages and removed from the ship to a remote, land-based location. 
The pirates then begin negotiations with the hostages’ employer for the release of the 
9 
 
crew members. In most cases the hostages are released once the ransom amount is 
received. A variation on this approach is for the pirates to remain on the ship and ransom 
the ship, crew, and goods back to the shipping company for an exorbitant sum.  
The third possible action is a complete high-jacking and confiscation of the ship, 
crew and cargo. Once the ship is under the pirates control, it is taken to a hidden location 
where the cargo is removed, the crew is either killed off or ransomed, and the ship is 
repainted by the pirates for use in future attacks. The ship’s navigation system is 
modified to squawk false identifications, allowing the pirates to trick other vessels into 
allowing them to get close enough to mount an attack. This method is virtually unheard 
of in Indonesian waters due to the additional time requirements and risk for the pirates.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Indonesian geography presents unique challenges that prevent traditional anti-
piracy methods from being deployed effectively. While current anti-piracy approaches, 
such as CTF-151, have reduced pirate attacks in traditional hotspots such as Somalia, 
detecting and responding to pirate attacks in time to prevent or defeat the attack is 
problematic for counter-piracy military and police forces. Commercial vessels in 
Indonesian waters often must fend for themselves against prepared and determined foes. 
Because of this, commercial vessels in Indonesian waters need an onboard means of 
preventing or delaying pirates from boarding.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The central research question is: What systems engineering solution will prevent 
or reduce the success of maritime piracy in Indonesian waters? the following research 
sub-questions were considered for this project: 
•       What capability gaps need to be addressed in current anti-piracy approaches? 
•       What characteristics, signatures and patterns mark a pirate vessel? 
•       What tactics, equipment, and methods are used by pirates during an attack? 
•       What distinguishes piracy in Indonesia from that in other regions? 
10 
 
D. PROJECT OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this project was to define and simulate a Boarding Prevention 
System (BPS) for use on commercial vessels affected by piracy in Indonesian waters. The 
results of the project simulation and cost modeling were used to recommend a specific 
system configuration of countermeasures to be employed by the BPS. 
E. SCOPE 
The definition and simulation of the BPS focused on determining the efficacy of 
multiple countermeasures working in concert. The capabilities, costs, reliability, 
maintainability, and supportability of the countermeasures were the main focus of 
investigation. Effects from crew training and capability were not examined and are a 
potential area for future study. 
In order to develop the BPS simulation, all the noted research questions were 
investigated. Analysis of the piracy problem in the Indonesian region was limited to 
pirate vessels, equipment, tactics, targeted commercial ships, and how the unique 
geography of the region affects anti-piracy efforts. Areas for further study could include 
the effectiveness of the local navies (Malaysian, Indonesian, Singaporean) working in 
concert to combat regional piracy. Additionally, socio-economic solutions to the regional 











In meeting the research objective stated above, this project identified an unmet 
commercial need, and applied a modified Systems Engineering methodology to refine, 
analyze, and address this need. The approach used for this project is detailed in this 
chapter and the results are shown in Chapter III. 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS OVERVIEW 
A tailored System Engineering (SE) process, summarized in Figure 3, was used to 
investigate and combat maritime piracy in troubled regions throughout the world, with a 
focus on commercial vessels in Indonesian waters. Six sequential main phases were 
identified, beginning with needs analysis and concluding with a recommended solution in 
the final report; each phase contained multiple sub-phases that were executed 
simultaneously. A tailored process model was chosen due to the limited scope of the 
project, and was loosely based on a Systems Engineering “Vee” methodology created by 




Figure 3. Project SE Process Overview 
This figure depicts the customized Systems Engineering process used to develop the 
system recommendation. The arrows between blocks represent outputs from one phase to 







The needs analysis built upon the general objective by defining stakeholder 
requirements and generating an effective need that could be met with a systems solution. 
A stakeholder analysis was performed, and the resulting stakeholders were categorized 
according to the type of role filled, such as regulatory or end user. Additionally, key 
stakeholders were identified, consisting of the entities that would be adopting the system, 
operating the system, or materially affected by the system. The needs of the stakeholders 
were discovered and used as the basis for the requirements definition phase. The phase 
was then concluded by deriving an effective need that could be satisfied with a systems 
solution.  
The second phase consisted of developing system requirements. Stakeholder 
needs were allocated to system requirements that provided aspects of the system. These 
requirements were then sorted into functional and non-functional requirements. The 
functional requirements were used to develop a functional architecture in the fourth 
phase. Since the problem had been narrowed down to specific requirements, a Design 
Reference Mission (DRM) was developed to generate a baseline pirate boarding threat 
scenario, intended for use during the construction of the model. Additionally, a Concept 
of Operations (CONOPS) was created to allow the project team to understand the system 
at the top level. 
The third phase developed the functional architecture of the system. A top-level 
function was generated from the effective need statement, and a functional decomposition 
was performed to derive lower level functions. Requirements were mapped to the 
generated functions; each function and requirement block was paired with at least one 
other block to avoid purchasing unnecessary capabilities and to ensure all stakeholder 
needs were met. The combination of the top-level and detailed functions formed the 
functional architecture, which was used in the system architecture development process. 
The phase wrapped up by developing an operational view OV-1 diagram to visualize top-
level architecture. 
The fourth phase developed the physical system architecture. Research was 
performed to identify COTS countermeasures that could provide at least one of the 
functional requirements of the system. The available countermeasures were narrowed to a 
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more workable list by performing a pairwise comparison and decision matrix analysis. 
Weighted functional requirements and factors such as estimated cost, operational 
availability, and required maintenance were used to select five system configurations for 
analysis. The cost and logistical footprint-centric approach was used as there was little or 
no data on the effectiveness of the countermeasures in the field; the initial decision matrix 
filtered out logistically infeasible system configurations. The functional attributes of the 
selected countermeasures were then used in the generation of a system model.  
The fifth phase consisted of building and running a system model. The 
operational constraints and system configurations were based on the DRM, while the 
success conditions were based on Key Performance Parameters (KPP) generated in the 
functional analysis phase. Multiple system configurations were developed and simulated 
to determine the effectiveness of both individual and combined countermeasures. Each 
scenario was iterated 1000 times and measures of effectiveness were generated for each 
countermeasure based on an average rate of success. A statistical analysis was performed 
to determine the effects of each countermeasure, and how each countermeasure interacted 
with other countermeasures. The highest scoring countermeasures and combinations were 
used to determine the system recommendation. The modeling and simulation phase fed 
back into the system architecture phase as the obtained results were used to refine the 
model and more closely reflect reality. Ultimately, the simulation results were used to 
rank the selected countermeasures by effectiveness. 
Finally, a recommended system configuration was chosen. In order to do this, a 
detailed cost analysis was performed for each high scoring countermeasure due to the 
importance of marketing to the largest possible customer base, ranging from large 
corporations to independent mariners. Life-cycle costs (LCC) and required maintenance 
were analyzed to generate a total system cost used to rank the top countermeasure. A 
recommendation was then chosen based on the best value system, which contained the 





B. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
The second phase of the project was to perform a needs analysis to determine and 
refine user and customer needs, considered to be unmet capabilities or approaches that 
can be made more cost-effective. A Stakeholder Analysis was performed to identify 
entities that would be utilizing and maintaining the system, or who represent sources of 
technical or financial information. The results of the Stakeholder Analysis were sorted 
into two groups: key stakeholders, and non-key stakeholders, based on a requisite 
authority to dictate system needs during development. The inputs from each key 
stakeholder were compiled to develop an objective list of stakeholder desires. Each item 
on this list was then marked as either a need or a want based on the relative level of 
importance to the project objective.  
Once a list of stakeholders had been compiled, stakeholder feedback was solicited 
to gain insight into each entity’s needs and desires. Phone discussions were conducted 
with representatives from shipping companies Maersk and Cosco, a U.S. Navy officer 
previously assigned to anti-piracy duties, and a merchant insurance company. A list of 
stakeholder wants and needs was generated from the gathered input, and common themes 
determined. Additional correspondence was conducted with technical representatives 
from companies producing anti-piracy products, providing technical and cost data, as 
well as a unique perspective on what attributes were needed for defensive system to be a 
success. Additionally, an Effective Need was derived from the list of stakeholder needs 
that represented the broadest possible need that must be fulfilled for the system to be 
successful. 
C. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 
The Requirements Analysis section transformed the unknown nature of the pirate 
danger into quantifiable criterion capable of being modeled using the results from the 
Needs Analysis. The top-level Effective Need was used to derive a top-level system 
requirement, which specifies the overall system attribute or capability required for 
mission success. The needs from the key stakeholders were used to generate specific 
requirements that would ensure the system fulfilled the associated need. Each 
requirement was then categorized as either functional or non-functional. A functional 
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requirement consists of a system requirement to perform some action or function, while a 
nonfunctional requirement consists of possessing some attribute or quality. Each 
functional requirement was used to develop a comprehensive requirements hierarchy by 
breaking down the top-level requirement into the lower-level requirements and showing 
the resulting connection between the low-level requirements and overall mission success. 
The next step in this phase was to develop a Design Reference Mission to define a 
baseline threat scenario. The Requirements Development phase concluded with the 
construction of a top-level Concept of Operations diagram and a system-level OV-1 
diagram, both used to present high-level goals and process statements in an easily 
comprehensible pictorial format. 
The DRM allowed the team to develop a common reference point with which to 
analyze piracy as a maritime threat. According to Lilly, a DRM “defines the specific 
projected threat and operating environment baseline for a given force element … and is 
primarily an engineering/design tool to support systems engineering activities by 
identifying significant design-driving operational elements and characterizing them to the 
level of detail necessary to assess design impact” (Lilly 2003, 257). Once the DRM was 
completed, the team was able to discuss, research, and develop the operational 
requirements from the same vantage point as well as properly assess the feasibility of 
possible solutions with respect to schedule, cost, and technical maturity. 
D. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The Functional Architecture phase translated the system requirements hierarchy 
into functions, which are considered to be actions or processes that the system performs. 
A function is derived from each requirement by determining what action is required to 
meet the associated requirement. Once all requirements had been met by a function, the 
functional relationship was mapped by decomposing the derived functions into detailed 
low-level functions, which represent specific processes which cumulatively lead to 
mission success. Each function block fulfilled at least one requirement block, while each 
requirement block was met with at least one function block, avoiding unmet requirements 
and non-required capabilities. 
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The top-level through low-level functional blocks combined to form the 
functional architecture, which was used to construct the system architecture. 
Additionally, a data model was generated, which is discussed further in section F, 
Modeling and Simulation, and is detailed in Appendix C. 
E. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The System Architecture phase allocated physical components to the functional 
architecture. This process was conducted by identifying physical countermeasures that 
would perform the desired function, and thus aid in meeting the overall functional 
requirement. Because this was an effort in identifying rather than developing 
countermeasures, our approach to developing the system architecture was to specify how 
multiple countermeasures could be incorporated into a common anti-boarding system and 
to identify Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) countermeasures that would fit into the 
architecture. A list of suitable countermeasures was compiled, and a trade study was 
performed via a decision matrix to narrow the available pool of possibilities to a small, 
manageable list. Measures of Performance (MOPs) were created and ranked using a 
pairwise comparison to determine the relative importance of each factor; each factor was 
then weighted per the results to allow assessment of the identified countermeasures. Once 
the factors had been weighted, a decision matrix was constructed to score each 
countermeasure against how well it performed each weighted factor, and the resulting 
scores were sorted highest to lowest. The top-performing countermeasures were selected 
for modeling and simulation to determine which system-of-systems (SoS) configuration 
of countermeasures offered the best anti-piracy performance. 
Research indicated that most commercial vessels do not deploy pirate 
countermeasures; amongst vessels that did, typically one countermeasure was used. The 
commercially available countermeasures were sorted into categories based on the 
expected amount of crew management required to operate the system during a pirate 
attack:  
 passive defense, a countermeasure that requires no crew management once 
deployed and affects pirates attempting to board the target vessel. 
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 active defense, a countermeasure that requires crew management when in 
operation and affects pirates attempting to board the target vessel. 
 active offense, a countermeasure that requires crew management when in 
operation and can affect pirates and/or pirate craft at range. 
Several Measures of Performance (MOP) were developed to analyze each piracy 
prevention countermeasure. Each measure was weighted using a pairwise comparison, 
which determines the relative importance of each measure and allows multiple 
countermeasures to be ranked according to determine decision-making criteria. A full list 
of the MOP’s is listed below along with a description and the evaluation criteria. 
 Measures of Performance 
The MOPs listed below were used for an initial evaluation of the COTS 
countermeasures to narrow the field of candidate countermeasures by and determine 
which of them were worth investigating. 
 Time to deploy 
o Deployment time is based upon the average length of time required for an 
average crewmember to set up the anti-piracy defensive system 
o Rating of 1 for < 1 minute to deploy 
o Rating of 5 for >5 minutes to deploy 
 Ease of use  
o This measure was based on the usability of the option by an average 
crewmember, relating to its effectiveness of use 
o Rating of 1 for few steps and intuitive use 
o Rating of 5 for numerous complex steps requiring skill and training 
 Maintenance  
o This measure was based on the need for and length of maintenance required for 
the anti-piracy option to be effective over a year of average use. This related to 
number of parts and complexity of the parts. 
o A rating of 1 was used for simple maintenance which could be performed 
onboard the vessel with little training by an average crewmember 
o A rating of 5 was used for options which require specialized offsite maintenance 




o This measure was based on the cost of use over the first five years of the options 
deployment, including purchase, operations, maintenance, and training costs. 
Rough estimates for cost were used at this stage due to the number of options. 
o A rating of 1 was given for an option costing less than $10,000 in its first five 
years of deployment 
o A rating of 5 was given to an option costing greater than $250,000 in its first five 
years of deployment 
 Ease of overcoming  
o This measure was based on the difficulty with which the adversary would have 
overcoming the countermeasure and continuing with their attempt to gain control 
of the vessel 
o A rating of 1 was given to options which required high skill and or numerous 
steps to overcome 
o A rating of 5 was given to options which required little skill or number of steps to 
overcome 
 Need for logistics support 
o This measure was based on the need to support the anti-piracy option with 
communications, intelligence and or consumables 
o A rating of 1 was given to options requiring little logistics support 
o A rating of 5 was given to options requiring high levels of logistics support 
 Effect on Crew 
o This measure was based on the effect of the countermeasure on the crew onboard 
the vessel using the option. Some options utilized acoustic or visual methods 
which could possibly harm the users if they malfunctioned slightly. 
o A rating of 1 was given to options which had a low probability of harming or 
incapacitating the crew of the vessel using the option 
o A rating of 5 was given to options which had a high probability of harming the 
crew of the vessel using the option 
Each measure was assigned a raw rank from 1 to 5 to designate relative 
importance to the system. The weighted level was determined by developing a linear 
equation containing the summation of the rank multiplied by a variable x, where to total 
of all weights is equal to one. Once the value of x was determined, it was multiplied by 
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the raw rank to determine a relative weighted value of each measure. The results of 
pairwise comparison can be found in Table 3, and were used in a decision matrix ranking 
system. 
Because the purchasers of the system were expected to be highly sensitive to the 
cost of the final selected system, this criterion was added to the decision matrix as a 
weighted measure. This allowed cost to be considered during the process of selecting the 
countermeasures to be modeled, reducing the likelihood that all selected countermeasures 
would have an unacceptable cost/benefit ratio when the simulations were complete. 
Table 3. Measures of Performance Criteria Ranking Weights 
This table shows the weighting of MOPs by assigning a raw rank from 1 (low) to 5 (high) 
to each measure, then normalizing rank by dividing each MOP by the sum of raw ranks 










Countermeasure must respond quickly to 
unexpected attack 
0.1305 
Ease of Use 3 
Countermeasure must be easy to use 
effectively due to high stress situations 
0.1305 
Maintenance 3 
Countermeasure must not require excessive 
maintenance to minimize Operations and 
Support costs.  
0.1305 
Cost 5 
Countermeasure must represent low 
cost/benefit ratio for purchase cost to 









Countermeasure must avoid encumbering the 
crew or associated ships with excessive 
logistics support. Common consumables can 





Countermeasure must maintain or improve 
the safety of the crew during a pirate attack. 
0.2175 
 
The decision matrix scores were based on the convention that a rating of 1 was 
desired and a rating of 5 was undesirable. The scores, based on the ratings of the 
countermeasures multiplied by the rankings of the measures, were summed across all 
measures then ranked based on their proximity to 1 or 5. The sum of the weighted scores 
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was then normalized to a percentage, representing how well each countermeasure met the 
ranked factors. The results for the examined system configurations are shown in Section 
III. The five highest ranked options were chosen for further analysis and input into the 
modeling phase.  
F. MODELING AND SIMULATION APPROACH 
The Modeling and Simulation Approach consisted of constructing and running the 
system model. The model utilized the DRM to generate the operational constraints and 
deterrent, while the only success condition was the commercial vessel preventing a 
successful boarding; the result was a model that accurately portrayed the operational 
environment. MATLAB, a programming language and computational environment, was 
used to create the model and run the associated simulations. The central variables 
contained a mix of random, constant, and probabilistic factors:  
 pirate skiffs were initially set at a constant range from the commercial ship 
 number of skiffs and initial angular direction from commercial ship were 
randomly chosen 
 countermeasure strikes for targets at range were assigned a probabilistic 
value of hitting the target.  
Multiple system configurations were developed and simulated to determine the 
effectiveness of both individual and combined countermeasures. Each scenario was run 
1000 times and measures of effectiveness (MoEs) were generated for each 
countermeasure based on an average rate of success. 
 The randomized design of experiments (DOE) was constructed to ensure the 
generation of valid data and efficiently plan the scenario run order. The top five 
countermeasures from the decision matrix each contained two discrete states, on and off. 






    
   
   
number of countermeasures
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The number of system configurations was reduced to twenty-four by removing 
the eight in which neither of the passive defense system configurations was used, despite 
an active system being utilized. An active defensive system is more manpower intensive 
than a passive system, and must be operated immediately before or during a pirate attack. 
The large cost difference between a passive system and an active system indicates that 
utilizing an active system without a passive component would be considered gold-plating, 
and as such should not be considered for recommendation. A practical scenario can be 
pictured to further illustrate this reduction: it is not standard practice to protect a home 
with a high-quality security system, yet neglect to install a lock on the door. As such, the 
number of possible system configurations can be safely reduced without filtering out 
potentially valid solutions.   
A statistical analysis was performed to determine the effects of each 
countermeasure, and how each countermeasure interacted with other countermeasure. 
The highest scoring countermeasure and combinations were used to determine the system 
recommendation. The modeling and simulation phase feeds back into the system 
architecture phase as the physical architecture, and thus the model, utilizes the obtained 
results to refine the model and more closely reflect reality. 
The model was set up to determine the percentage of successful defenses against 
pirate attacks through use of passive defense, active defense and/or active offensive 
methods for the status quo scenario as well as finding the best current solution and 
recommending options for further advanced study. 
Model system configurations were run against a DRM with varying piracy 
countermeasure combinations enabled aboard the target ship. For each configuration, 100 
simulation runs were performed and evaluated and the overall percentage of successful 
defenses of the vessel were calculated to generate initial data in order to facilitate 
analysis. A follow-on effort of 1000 runs for each scenario was completed to validate and 
refine the initial results by filtering outlying values and generating a precise average. The 
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cost of each scenario was independently calculated, and the success percentage and cost 
were equally weighted against each other to determine the best scenario. 
1. Model Foundation 
The Model was created as an incremental-time object-oriented MATLAB 
program. MATLAB was selected due to its wide availability, commonality across 
organizations, and flexibility. Lower-level programming languages, which are close to 
machine code, were declined due to the reduced ability to transfer the model amongst 
different computing environments. Higher-level modeling tools, which are closer to 
human spoken language, were not selected due to concerns over their flexibility and 
reduced availability. MATLAB represents a midlevel programming language that 
maintains most of the flexibility of the lower-level languages, while using the higher-
level language verbiage. 
2. Model Architecture 
Figure 4 shows the overall architecture structure of the model. The program was 
divided into thirteen object classes, three enumeration classes, and one helper function 
file. The enumeration classes are used to define commonly used states for other classes 
and map logical states to discrete values for MATLAB to track. The helper function is 
used to define the commonly used get_angle function as it does not inherently belong to 
any particular class. The object classes define the logical constructs that the model is built 
of and are described below. Additionally, a UML relational diagram was generated to 
control and document the interactions between the model functions. This diagram can be 





Figure 4.  Model Architecture 
This figure depicts the Domain Manager and the modules created inside it, consisting of 
Commercial Ship, Display, Military Ship, and multiple instances of pirate skiffs. The 
commercial ship and the skiff modules each create low level modules that track either 
crew or pirates, while the commercial ship also creates countermeasure modules. 
a. Domain_Manager 
The prebuilt functions included in MATLAB are not powerful enough to manage 
a model of this complexity, so a custom background object called Domain Manager, was 
developed to control operation of the overall model. It creates the other objects within 
itself, initializes them, and then calls their operations iteratively to simulate the passage 
of time. Domain Manager controls the passing of data between the other objects (as 
opposed to a shared memory structure). Domain Manager determines when a scenario 
has concluded based upon established criteria; primarily that all pirates have been 
disabled or that one has boarded. The Domain Manager also controls repeated runs of the 
various system configurations in order to calculate the overall MOE. Domain Manager is 
the connection between the MATLAB user interface and the rest of the program, it takes 
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in the scenario configuration and outputs the calculate probability of survival for the 
commercial ship. 
b. Com_Ship 
The Commercial Ship class represents the target ship from the DRM within the 
model. It tracks the location, velocity and all other necessary factors associated with the 
ship’s status and actions. The Commercial Ship object contains within itself objects 
representing all of its crew members as well as the objects associated with each 
countermeasure. 
The Commercial Ship is represented within the model not as a rectangle but rather 
as a point in space. Figure 5 shows how the dimensions of the ship sides were 
approximated with angles from the center point. 
Note from Figure 4 that the Crew objects are shown in the same color but the 
Countermeasure objects are varying. This is because Commercial Ship creates several 
instances of the same Crew class but the Countermeasures actually consist of various 




Figure 5.  Com_Ship Angular Approximations 
This figure depicts how the dimensions of the ship sides were approximated with 
angles measured from the center point. 
c. Mil_Ship 
The Military Ship class generically represents some assisting vessel coming to the 
aid of the Commercial Ship that can stop the pirate attack if it arrives in time. The 
program object actually does very little, merely tracking its own progression. If it reaches 
the Commercial Ship then Domain Manager will end the scenario. 
d. Skiff 
The Skiff class represents the pirate vessels within the model. The object tracks 
the status (active or disabled), position, and remaining crew of a particular skiff and 
determines the skiff’s next actions when called. As shown in Figure 4, each Skiff object 
also contains a number of Pirate objects (described below) and triggers them to carry out 
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their own actions in each time increment. The Skiff objects are all generated and tracked 
by Domain Manager. 
In general, Skiffs move directly towards the Commercial Ship in an attempt to 
allow their Pirates to board. Skiffs can be disabled by countermeasures, rendering them 
immobile. If all Skiffs in the scenario are disabled the Domain Manager will end the 
scenario. 
e. Display 
The Display class is a special use class that is only invoked when a demonstration 
version of the model is called from Domain Manager. The Display object translates the 
data stored within Domain Manager into a visual display of the moving ships and skiffs 
for each time increment. Display was created primarily to enable debugging, validation of 
overall operation, and to facilitate presentation and explanation of the model. Figure 6 
shows an example of the Display class output. Note that active Skiffs are denoted by red 
circles, disabled ones by grey, the Commercial Ship by blue and the Military Ship (out of 




Figure 6. Example of Display 
This figure depicts the display module tracking the commercial ship, disabled pirate 
skiffs, and active pirate skiffs. Skiffs begin as red circles and turn black if 
neutralized. The commercial ship attempts to approach military vessel (not shown) 
before being overwhelmed. 
f. Pirate 
The Pirate object represents an individual pirate. A Pirate can transition primarily 
between different states and keeps track of the time required for individual pirates to 
accomplish tasks, such as boarding the side of a Commercial Ship. 
Pirate objects are created and reside within Skiff objects. Seven pirate objects are 
created at the start of each run. The Skiff passes update calls down to the Pirate object as 







The Crew class is largely a vestigial remnant within the model. Most of the 
intended functionality of the class was de-scoped from this iteration of the model. Crew 
objects reside within the Commercial Ship object. 
h. Pirate_Status/Skiff_Status/Crew_Status 
The three Status classes define enumeration sets. Enumeration sets are used in 
programming to provide meaningful names in software code to what is essentially a list 
of identifiers. In this example each of these classes represents a list of possible states that 
their respective objects may be in at a given time. The enumerations can be invoked 
throughout the entire program to provide a meaningful title to the status as opposed to a 
number. 
i. Countermeasures 
The Countermeasure classes are each defined individually. They were generated 
this way, instead of through an inheritance structure, due to the drastically different ways 
in which the countermeasures operate. Additionally, different types and fidelity of data 
are available for the different countermeasures and it was not prudent to treat them 
similarly. Five shipboard countermeasures were selected from the trade study for 
modeling and simulation. The approach used to model the individual Countermeasure 
classes is described in the following chapter. 
3. Countermeasure Implementation 
a. Pirate Trap (P-Trap) 
The pirate trap countermeasure is a system of difficult to see lines trailed through 
the water along the sides of and behind the commercial ship in order to foul the propellers 
of pirate craft. Figure 7 shows how these physical regions were translated into angular 




Figure 7. P-Trap Regions of Effect 
This figure depicts how the trailing lines of the p-trap were translated into angular 
representations within the model. 
Each P-Trap region within the model can stop 10 pirate skiffs in a given scenario. 
Each region is created as a separate instance of the class and tracks how many lines it has 
remaining. 
a. Water Cannon 
The water cannon countermeasure features a remote-controlled water turret that 
operates like a fire hose in suppressing and forcing away pirates. The intended use is to 
flood the skiffs, but it was determined that the pirates would seek to avoid this eventuality 
so within the model the Water Cannon object acts to force skiffs out of its range. The 
Water Cannons act on one skiff at a time and causes them to flee the Commercial Ship’s 
proximity. Each of the six Water Cannons is created as its own instance and tracks its 




Figure 8. Water Cannon Regions of Effect 
This figure depicts placement of water cannons on ship, as well as the associated 
angular representation used in the model. 
b. Razor/Barbed Wire 
The countermeasure option of wrapping the perimeter of the ship with barbed or 
razor wire is represented by the Barbed Wire class. The Barbed Wire object in turn 
creates a large quantity of Barbed Wire Segment objects which each track the health of 
the barbed wire over a small portion of the Commercial Ship’s circumference. 
The Barbed Wire directly adds two minutes of scenario time needed for a Pirate to 
bypass the Barbed Wire Segment. Multiple Pirates at the same Barbed Wire Segment can 
work together to accelerate the time they bypass it in. 
c. Pirate Curtain 
The commercially advertised pirate curtain system consists of a combination of 
fire hoses used to flood pirate skiffs and erratically flailing hoses with weighted ends that 
can cause bodily harm to individuals scaling the side of the vessel. It was determined that 
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the first component of the system heavily overlapped with the Water Cannon already 
under consideration, but that the flail version represented a unique countermeasure 
option. The Pirate Curtain class then represents the flail portion alone of the 
commercially proposed solution. 
The Object monitors the Port and Starboard regions of the Commercial Ship and 
applies a chance to strike any pirate who is in the process of attempting to board. If 
struck, the Pirate is presumed to be permanently disabled within the timeline of the 
scenario. 
d. Air Cannon 
The air cannon is a mounted, remote controlled turret that fires one of several 
projectiles to stop pirate skiffs. Selected for the model from among these was the net/line 
option that is fired at pirate craft to ensnare their propellers. 
The Air Cannon class fires nets at regular intervals at random pirate skiffs within 
its range. With each shot there is a chance to miss. The cannon is currently represented as 
having a clear field of view across all angles. It has a limited number of shots for each 
scenario based off the assumption that pirate weapon fire will prevent the crew from 
reloading the deck-mounted launcher. 
4. Model Implementation 
Appendix B contains the model script code and soft copy is available upon 
request. Appendix C contains a Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram showing 
how the class relationships were implemented. 
G. COST ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Commercial shipping is a profit-driven industry, and as such will only adopt a 
piracy defensive system if the benefits outweigh the cost of implementation. The system 
will be marketed towards a range of merchant companies, ranging from independent 
ship-owners running single ships to mega-corporations such as Maersk, who command 
over 600 vessels. A cost analysis was performed on all system configurations for factors 
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such as initial purchase cost as well as logistical support, and the results combined into a 
five year total cost.  
1. Cost Model 
The cost model used in this project for each countermeasure was formulated 
based on a number of factors specific to each system. The cost was calculated as a five 
year total ownership cost using net present value. An aggressive, 6% yearly inflation rate 
was used to reduce the likelihood that the estimated costs generated by the model would 
underestimate the Boarding  Prevention System cost in order to account for items not 
included in the model. Since the shipping companies likely have large bank accounts, the 
interest that the companies earn on their product or overhead accounts was estimated at 
3.3%. The timespan of five years was used as that is a typical overhaul time period for 
U.S. naval vessels, at which point the ships maintenance authority would utilize an 
overhaul budget separate from the O&M budget used for normal operations. 
Manufacturing companies of current anti-piracy systems fitting our system 
descriptions were polled to determine system specific cost information. The companies 
were asked to provide data on initial purchases, maintenance, IT support, integration cost 
and operation specific data for each system. Data was reported as months for time based 
data and FY14 dollars for monetary data. The requested data included: 
 
Initial Purchase 
Estimated Initial Contracting percentage 
Initial Consumables price 
Initial System Price 
Manufacturer 
Number of Systems needed to support vessel 
 
Maintenance 
Estimated time between unplanned maintenance 
Estimated cost for unplanned maintenance 
Estimated Routine maintenance cost 




Estimated interval between IT support 
Estimated IT Support cost 
 
Complexity 
Estimated ship integration cost per system 
 
Operations 
Estimated system life 
Estimated routine Consumable cost 
Estimated Time between Consumables purchases 
 
2. Labor Cost 
The labor cost of operations for vessel crew members was not factored into this 
cost estimate as the labor rates per shipping company representatives may vary based on 
a wide variety of factors including time of year, national origin of the shipping company, 
etc.  The contracting effort was taken to be a series of one time purchases with a single 
contracting percentage. More complex contracting vehicles, such as those with multi-year 
options or clauses or variable contracting percentages, are out of the scope of this project. 
3. System Purchasing 
Total purchasing price for the vessel-wide Boarding-Prevention System was 
separated into sub-categories as well as the initial purchase of materials or services prior 
to the initial build and integration as well as for five years of system use. A limitation of 
this model is that it assumes that the boarding-prevention countermeasures will be used 
on a scheduled basis, which will hopefully not be the case. As this will likely assume 
usage on a higher rate than real world usage for these systems, the estimate will be 
slightly high, thus deferring unforeseen charges. Year zero is taken to be FFY14 and 
accounts for the vessel being in a maintenance status for a lengthy repair time period. 
During the time period in year zero the vessel holding company will contract for the 
purchase, integration documentation and crew training regarding the vessel-wide 
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boarding-prevention system and perform the purchasing as well as the integration efforts. 
A short time frame is sufficient for contracting efforts of this type of system since the 
boarding-prevention systems will be COTS items with minimal modifications. Year zero 
costs therefore are in FY14 costs and Year one will start as of FY15 for actual 
countermeasure usage. The consumables and maintenance budgeted for year zero will be 
utilized  for the initial integration effort and those line items budgeted for years one 
through five will be used for underway use. 
The total initial purchase price is based on formula (3) below: 
 
   
   
     1  *
  * #  
contracting percentage




  (3) 
4. System Life-Cycle Considerations 
Since the system is estimated to have a usage life and not last indefinitely, the 
estimated countermeasure life (assuming regular maintenance per the manufacturer) was 
taken into account for system purchases in out years. A round-down function noting the 
number of months for the countermeasure life span as well as the number of months until 
the end of the purchase year in question was used to predict the system purchase price for 
all out years up until five years have passed. The year zero is taken to be the initial 
purchasing contract pricing, with years one through five being the O&M budget for the 
ship for each of those years, regarding the boarding-prevention countermeasure usage. 
The round-down function, executed via Excel, accounts for the fact that each purchase 
will be an individual event and partial system purchases will not be made. 
System purchase in years one through five is based on formula (4): 
 
 










   
 
  (4) 
The total integration cost (TIC) is based on the following formula (5): 
        1  * #  *   TIC contracting percentage of systems systemintegrationcost    (5) 
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For years one through five, a round-down function was used to determine the 
number of countermeasures needing to be integrated for each of those years. It takes into 
account the system life as well as the number of months which have elapsed by the end of 
that fiscal year (FY) and the total system integration cost. Additionally, the round-down 
function takes factors in that the system integrations will be individual events and cannot 
happen as partial events.   
System Integration for out years is based on the formula below (6): 
 
 










   
 
  (6) 
5. Consumables 
Consumables used in the total system under routine use were accounted for in a 
yearly consumables line item. The routine consumable cost for a set time span for each 
individual system was obtained from the manufacturer as well as the length in months of 
that time span, i.e., how often a batch of consumables would need to be purchased. Year 
zero routine consumable purchases represent the price for one set of the routine 
consumables in addition to those which will come with the countermeasure, since those 
often become expended during check out testing. For years one through five the pricing is 
calculated using a round-down function (7) including the routine cost, routine usage 
period and the total number of months until the end of that yearly time period; the costs 
associated with previous years are subtracted. The round-down function accounts for the 
fact that the consumable purchases will occur as individual events and cannot occur as 
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Routine maintenance costs are calculated by accounting for the time period in 
question (initial or later years), as well as the mean time between maintenance for the 
countermeasure and the routine maintenance costs. As with other cost sub-categories in 
this cost model, the routine maintenance cost uses a round-down function (8) which 
accounts for each routine maintenance action being an individual action which cannot be 
conducted as a partial action. For years two through five the maintenance performed in 
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Unscheduled maintenance cost is calculated by assuming a ratio of routine to 
unscheduled maintenance. Or the total maintenance period, it is estimated that 78 % of 
the maintenance is routine maintenance since these systems are only a few levels deep 
regarding systems of systems. This makes the unscheduled maintenance 22 % of the total 
number of maintenance actions. If a particular system has reason to believe that the ratio 
between routine and unscheduled maintenance is something different than this, the ratio 
of routine to unscheduled maintenance is a variable which can be changed within the 
model. The time between unscheduled maintenance events is taken from the ratio of 
unscheduled to routine maintenance actions as well as the MTBM for routine 
maintenance (9). This MTBM for unscheduled maintenance is used along with an 
estimated cost for the unscheduled maintenance actions to determine the yearly 
unscheduled maintenance costs. A round-down function (10) is used to determine the 
number of individual unscheduled maintenance actions within the yearly time frame; this 
round down function takes into account the fact that the unscheduled maintenance actions 
are individual actions which can’t be performed as partial events. If a cost for 
unscheduled maintenance was unable to be found from a vendor, the cost for the 
unscheduled maintenance was estimated to be three times the cost of scheduled 
maintenance for that same system. 
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7. IT Support 
After detailed queries for each countermeasure had been performed, it was 
determined that the articles onboard ship would not likely have automated tracking or 
self-diagnostic systems and that IT support would not be needed. In this case, the values 
within the algorithm were set to zero for IT support (11). 
       0 5 0nIT support cost for years IT    (11) 
8. Documentation 
Documentation is a key piece of the operating environment for the 
countermeasures. In order to perform the initial documentation effort, it was assumed that 
a quality assurance representative from either the manufacturing company or the vessel 
holding company would spend 80 hours’ time (two week time frame was assumed based 
on team member experience with documentation efforts) drafting the initial 
documentation manual, after which a team of senior engineers would spend 
approximately three weeks’ time to review and publish the documentation. Fully 
burdened labor rates for quality assurance representatives and senior engineers were 
taken from the department of labor website at $89.19 and $113.08, respectively. Given 
that countermeasures with more complex sub-systems would require more documentation 
for use and maintenance of those sub-systems, the complexity factor discussed above was 
multiplied against the sum product of the labor rates and time required by the QA 
representative and the senior engineers. For later years it was assumed that the 
documentation would need to be updated approximately once a year based on team 
member experience with IT software documentation updates for the Navy Oil Analysis 
Laboratory or NOAP program. The cost for these documentation updates was estimated 
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to be half of the cost of the initial documentation effort, based on half the number of labor 
hours being needed. 
The hourly rates consist of : 
 Hourly Rate, Quality Assurance Representative (HRQ) = $89.19 
 Hourly Rate, Senior Engineer (HRS) = $113.08 
Formulas (12) and (13) were used to determine initial and recurring 
documentation costs: 
       80* 1 20*Initial DocumentationCost IDC HRQ HRS    (12) 
    1 5   0.5 * nDocumentation for years DC IDC    (13) 
9. Training 
Training for each countermeasure was assumed to be performed during the initial 
build/integration/trial period. The quality assurance representative, who wrote the 
manual, or an equally paid and competent contemporary, would perform the training for 
the units for the entire vessel staff. It was assumed that the training would take two weeks 
(80 hours) worth of time at the quality assurance representative’s labor rate, as discussed 
above (14). This time was also multiplied by the complexity factor to account for 
countermeasures, which may have lengthy training needed to train crew in proper use 
(15). IT was assumed that the training would only need to occur once, and any further 
training would be passed down from crew member to crew member on the vessel, and 
therefore does not need to be accounted for within the cost estimate. Travel for the 
quality assurance representative was not accounted for within the cost estimate as the 
manufacturing company location and the vessel location are unknown. 
       80 * InitialTraining Cost ITC HRQ   (14) 
     1 5   0nTraining cost for years TC    (15) 
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10. Net-Present-Value Calculation 
The cost for initial purchase of the vessel-wide countermeasure installation, the 
vessel-wide system integration, the routine consumable price, routine and unscheduled 
maintenance costs, IT support, documentation and training are all summed up each year 
and multiplied by the yearly estimated inflation then divided by the yearly interest 
generated by the vessel company to get a yearly present value for the boarding-
prevention countermeasure from year zero to year five (16). The net present value was 
calculated by summing each yearly present value. It was assumed that the 
countermeasures would be used until they no longer functioned properly, and as such 
there was no resale price taken into account at the end of the five-year period as with 
some system configurations. 
The variables used as inputs for all five countermeasures were based on OEM 
queries as well as trade articles and estimation by similarity when other values could not 
be found. Due to relative system simplicity, the complexity factors for each system were 
set to one. Routine maintenance costs were not available from the manufacturers, so a 
standard of two men for eight hours at $40/hr. was chosen, giving a $640 cost to all 
routine maintenance events. Unplanned maintenance events were estimated to take three 
times longer than their scheduled counterparts, therefore making them $1920 per event. 
An unscheduled maintenance event cost of $8,000 was found for the compressed air 
launcher based on manufacturers input. The MTBM for routine maintenance events was 
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H. SELECTING THE SYSTEM SOLUTION 
Shipping companies ranging from large corporations to independent mariners are 
expected to adopt the boarding prevention system; the final stage of this project 
determined the intersection point of cost vs performance to appeal to the broadest 
possible number of system users. Due to the profit-driven nature of the commercial 
shipping industry, any countermeasure must both provide an effective defense against 
maritime piracy and be economically affordable. The best value system was one which 
would be both effective for survivability in an attack situation and cost-effective. 
The modeled system configurations were scored using the survival data from the 
modeling phase and the five-year cost from the cost analysis. All system configurations 
that did not produce mission successes were discarded to remove inconsequential data. 
Each scenario was plotted on a single chart to produce a visual representation of the 
results; the x-axis represented cost while the y-axis represented survival rate.  
A numerical analysis was then performed to normalize cost and survival data into 
a single ranking. The scenario with the highest rate of success was determined, and all 
individual system configurations were divided by the first; the results indicate to what 
extent each scenario matches the performance of the theoretical maximum. A similar 
operation was then performed on the cost data to determine lowest cost, and how well 
other system configurations matched this value. The cost ranking and survival were then 
multiplied together to determine the overall ranking. Three solutions were selected, 
consisting of a cheap scenario with medium effectiveness, a high-effectiveness scenario, 















A. NEEDS ANALYSIS RESULTS 
1. Stakeholders  
By following the process outlined in the Analysis section, the list of stakeholders 
below was generated. All needs of the stakeholders were aggregated, but not all were 
implemented in creating system requirements, as some needs were not cost feasible. 
a. Key Stakeholders 
Our research showed that the key stakeholders were the crew that would use the 
BPS system, the shipping companies owning the vessels the BPS would be installed on, 
and the customers of said companies. The stakeholders are detailed below. 
Shipping Companies 
A multitude of commercial shipping companies operating vessels under many 
different flags (US/European shipping ~20% of traffic). The companies are responsible 
for implementing new boarding-prevention solutions including the cost of incorporating 
the solution as the primary stakeholder for the output of this project. 
Merchant Vessel Crew Members 
The safety of the crew is of obvious importance. Crew members that may be 
taken hostage have an inherent risk of being harmed or even killed if pirate demands are 
not met in a timely manner. Pirates may even harm the crew to prove the seriousness of 
their intent. Further, any component of the system solution that is an active offensive or 
defensive measure must be operated by a crew member. 
Shipping Company Customers 
The customers of shipping companies have a certain confidence in any given 
shipping company to deliver cargo to the destination for a cost and in a timely manner as 
agreed in their contracts. If a merchant vessel is captured, the cargo may be lost. Even if a 
captured vessel is returned to shipping company control, the cargo will almost certainly 
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be late. Customers of shipping companies often have customers themselves in the global 
merchant market. Therefore, pirate deterrence is of significant important for customers of 
shipping companies.  
a. Other Stakeholders 
 Pirates 
The pirates, being the subject of prevention, must be considered a stakeholder of 
the system. It should be noted that the pirates are considered to be a dynamic force, and 
therefore shall respond to the system as necessary, modifying tactics to nullify or mitigate 
the effectiveness of countermeasures. For example, if pirates notice that the starboard 
side of the ship is incorporating P-Trap countermeasures, they may choose to attack the 
port side of the ship. Factors such as these were incorporated into the statistical 
probabilities of each selected component of the system’s ability to deter pirate boarding. 
USPACOM (US NAVY Pacific Command) 
USPACOM is the United States Navy element responsible for the Pacific Ocean 
area, including the waters around Indonesia. It consists of the United States Third and 
Seventh Fleets and several other subordinate task forces. USPACOM has a potential 
interest in the results of this capstone project. 
IMO (International Maritime Organization) 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized agency of the 
United Nations whose primary responsibility is improving the safety and security of 
international shipping. Its secondary responsibility is environmental, preventing marine 
pollution from ships. The standards and regulations of the IMO apply to all vessels that 
operation internationally. Their stake in anti-piracy operations in the Indonesia region 
pertains to their responsibility to maintaining and improving the safety and security of 
international shipping. 
Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian (Local) Navies 
These countries are currently providing the bulk of patrolling naval forces in the 
affected region. These parties have a potential interest in the changes in commercial 
vessel response to pirate attacks in their national waters. 
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2. Stakeholder Needs 
The list of stakeholders and needs discovered through the research process 
outlined in Chapter II are listed in Table 4. Similar needs and desires were grouped 
together to minimize space and aid in system design, and an effective need was generated 
from the inputs gathered from the key stakeholders.  
Some of the suggested needs are easily incorporated into the scope of a Boarding 
Prevention System, such as logistical support considerations. However, other inputs were 
not feasible as requested, such as eliminating maritime piracy worldwide. Others were 
not within the scope of creating a boarding prevention system, such as tracking 

















Table 4.  List of Identified Stakeholder Needs 
This table summarizes the needs identified from the stakeholder analysis and notes which 
stakeholders have a given need. 
 
Stakeholder Need Applicable Stakeholders Within Scope Of 
Project? 
Provide Situational Awareness 
(SA) 
Shipping Companies 
Merchant Vessel Crew 
No 
Track Suspicious Vessels Shipping Companies 




Prevent ships from being captured 
by pirates 
Shipping Companies 
Merchant Vessel Crew 




Protect Crew Shipping Companies 
Merchant Vessel Crew 
Yes 
Deny Hostile Access to ship Shipping Companies 
Merchant Vessel Crew 
Shipping Company Customers 
Yes 
Halt Maritime piracy worldwide Shipping Companies 
Merchant Vessel Crew 





High Operational Availability Shipping Companies Yes 
Cost-effective, affordable 
maintenance 
Shipping Companies Yes 
Minimal installation requirements Shipping Companies Yes 
Interoperability across 




Ruggedized Equipment Shipping Companies 
Merchant Vessel Crew 
Yes 
Ease of Use Shipping Companies 
Merchant Vessel Crew 
Yes 
Cost-effective Shipping Companies 
Shipping Company Customers 
Yes 
Low Operational and Support 
Costs 
Shipping Companies 
Shipping Company Customers 
Yes 
Low logistical Impact Shipping Companies 
Merchant Vessel Crew 
Shipping Company Customers 
Yes 
Effective against all pirate vessels Shipping Companies 








3. Effective Need  
The analysis of stakeholder needs showed that preventing pirate control of a 
merchant vessel is paramount. The prevention of pirate control however, is in every case 
precluded by the pirates themselves boarding the vessel. Therefore, the system solution 
must economically and efficiently prevent pirates from boarding commercial vessels in 
Indonesian waters, maintaining compliance with international maritime law. This anti-
boarding system concept was given the name “Boarding Prevention System” or BPS. A 
context diagram detailing the boundaries of the system and interaction with external 
entities is shown below in Figure 9. The context diagram serves as a pictorial 
representation of the overall flow of information and material. Four primary external 
entities are listed: the commercial vessel, friendly forces, a fishing fleet composed of 




Figure 9. Context Diagram 






B. REQUIREMENTS  
1. Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
The top-level CONOPS includes a commercial shipping vessel, pirate skiffs, and 
rescue forces. Pirate vessels approach the commercial vessel during transit and attempt to 
hijack the ship. The commercial vessel will immediately call for aid, and attempt to hold 
off the attacking forces until friendly vessels arrive. Once friendly naval or coast guard 
forces approach, the pirates will scatter in the face of superior firepower. Figure 10 
illustrates the CONOPS, and is overlaid over a map of Indonesia. 
 
Figure 10. Top-Level CONOPS 
This figure depicts the top-level operation of system. Pirates attack the commercial 
ship, which defends using onboard countermeasures until friendly military or coast 





The CONOPS aided the effort of further defining the situation in which the BPS 
would be used by focusing research on the maximum time required for the BPS to 
operate before assistance would arrive. Once this was determined, efforts were focused 
on analyzing the boarding attempt, generating an OV-1 diagram which divides the 
operational theater into four ranges, from detection point to interception. Defensive 
systems will focus on either one or multiple ranges, and will use some combination of 
active and passive countermeasures to prevent hijacking. The OV-1 is shown in Figure 
11. 
 
Figure 11. OV-1 Operational Concept 
This figure depicts the use of ship-borne countermeasures against pirates at various 
ranges. Close through long ranged countermeasures act against skiffs, while anti-






2. Design Reference Mission  
A Design Reference Mission was constructed to define a baseline threat scenario. 
The overall scenario consists of commercial vessels traveling through pirate infested 
travel routes surrounding Indonesia. The operational environment, shown in Figure 12, 
consists of a cargo ship attacked by pirate skiffs 100 nm from an allied military base. Aid 
is requested, and the military ship launches immediately on an intercept course. Pirates 
attempt to board the commercial ship and obtain control of it; the ship deploys the anti-
boarding defensive system to prevent the loss of the ship.  
 
Figure 12. Operational Environment 
This figure depicts the operational environment and the key entities involved in a typical 
scenario. 
The scenario assumes that the pirate attack will cease if driven off or friendly 
vessels arrive to aid the commercial ship. The mission is defined as a success if the 
pirates are prevented from gaining control of the commercial ship. Success scoring is 
based on the following factors: 
o Pirates are prevented from boarding ship through various methods 
o Ship maneuvers to safe waters OR Navy task force arrives 
o Loss of crew life is minimized 
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3. Functional Requirements 
The top-level requirement of the system is the prevention of pirates from boarding 
the commercial vessel and gaining control of it. A decomposition of this requirement is 
shown below in Figure 13. The top-level requirement can be accomplished by impeding 
the entry routes of the pirates, forcing the pirate skiffs away from the vessel, or by 
degrading pirate capabilities. Increasing the distance between pirate skiffs and the 
commercial vessel can be accomplished in two ways: by increasing operational range or 
by a system configuration that decreases the pirate craft’s ability to remain in the 
operational range. Finally, the pirate capabilities can be degraded by reducing pirate craft 
maneuverability, neutralizing pirate crew, or impairing pirate communications. 
 
Figure 13. Piracy Prevention System Requirements 
This figure depicts the requirements for the BPS, showing the breakdown of the top-






The requirements generated from the decomposition of the top-level requirement 
are described in Table 5. 
Table 5: Functional Requirements 
This table identifies the functional requirements from the stakeholder needs and provides 
additional details. 
# 
Functional  Requirement 
Name 
Requirement Detail 
1.0 Prevent boarding by pirates 
the system shall prevent a pirate boarding long 
enough for help to arrive. 
1.1 Impede pirate entry routes 
the system shall impede pirate boarders from using 
their typical boarding routes. 
1.2 
Force pirate craft away 
from ship 
the system shall push pirate vessels away from the 
ship to a distance of greater than 3 meters. 
1.3 Disable pirate vessels 
the system shall degrade the pirates’ ability to 
execute their mission by disabling propulsion, 
crew capability, and ability to coordinate. 
1.3.1 
Disable the pirate vessels’ 
propulsion 
the system shall disable the pirate crafts’ ability to 
keep up with the commercial vessel. 
1.3.2 Disable pirate crews 
the system shall neutralize pirate crew and 
boarders as participants in the attack using 
nonlethal methods 
1.3.3 
Disable pirate Command 
and Control (C2) 
the system shall prevent the pirates from 
effectively coordinating their assault 
 
 
4. Non-Functional Requirements 
The non-functional requirements listed in Table 6 represent the stakeholder needs 
that were unmet by the functional requirements. These requirements were given 





Table 6. Non-Functional Requirements 
This table identified the functional requirements from the stakeholder needs and provides 
additional details. 
Non-functional  
Requirement Name Requirement Detail 
Compliance with 
international law 
the system shall comply with all applicable laws for 
international waters 
High system reliability  
the system shall incorporate a MTBF sufficient for the 
vessel to complete 10 voyages between average failures.  
Cost-effectiveness 
the system shall have an affordable purchase cost and 
minimize Operations & Support costs 
Standard deck equipment 
interface and installation 
the system shall require minimal installation time and shall 
not require a dry dock or non-standard tools 
Interoperability 
the system shall be usable on all commercial ships 
manufactured globally in the last 30 years 
Affordable and simple 
logistics support 
the system shall not require unique or hard-to-obtain 
consumables nor shall it require replacement of routine 
consumables more frequently than once per quarter 
Increase the range at 
which pirate craft can 
remain near the ship 
unmolested 
the system shall increase the range pirate craft must remain 
at in order to avoid countermeasures. 
the system shall decrease 
the pirate crafts’ ability 
to remain within the 
protected region 
the system shall reduce the time that a pirate craft will 




the system shall have minimal impact on the environment  
the system shall not produce any waste harmful to the crew 
or requiring enhanced disposal techniques 
Low maintenance 
the system shall not require active oversight for deployed 
passive systems 
the system shall not require more scheduled maintenance 
than  standard deck equipment 
Built-in, automatic 
notification of failures 
the system shall create  an audio-visual notification if a 
failure occurs that would prevent mission success 
 
C. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE  
After analyzing the requirements for the BPS, the functional development process 
generated an overall function for the system, which was then decomposed into more 
defined functional elements. The overall function was for the system to prevent pirates 
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from boarding the commercial vessel, and the decomposed functions providing the 
specific tactical functions (second and third level functions) can be found in Figure 14. 
Several identified requirements were also determined to be non-viable for 
implementation in the BPS. Specifically, neutralizing pirate crew via lethal measures will 
encounter numerous ethical, legal, and safety guidelines. Additionally, the impairment of 
communications is not a viable approach; pirates typically do not coordinate between 
skiffs once an attack is started. Therefore, the project shall prevent pirates from boarding 
the commercial vessel by some combination of impeding entry routes, forcing pirate craft 
away from the target ship, or degrading pirate capabilities. 
 
Figure 14. Top-level Functional Hierarchy of BPS 
This figure depicts the functional decomposition from the top-level function of boarding 
prevention to lower-level functions detailing how the overall function is accomplished. 







Table 7. BPS Functions 
This table identifies the system functions from the functional requirements and provides 
additional details. 
# Function Name Function Detail 
1.0 Prevent boarding by pirates 
the system shall prevent a pirate boarding long 
enough for help to arrive through use of 
countermeasures. 
1.1 Impede pirate entry routes 
Block routes of ingress to the commercial vessel or 
increase difficulty and time required to board by 
using obstacles and hoses.  
1.2 
Force pirate craft away 
from ship 
Physically push pirate craft out of boarding range 
or create zones pirate craft will avoid. 
1.3 Disable pirate vessels 
Degrade the pirates’ ability to execute their 
mission by disabling propulsion, crew capability, 
and ability to coordinate by using 
countermeasures. 
1.3.1 
Disable the pirate vessels’ 
propulsion 
Foul pirate craft propellers with projectiles, lines, 
and nets. 
1.3.2 Disable pirate crews 
Non-lethally subdue pirates or knock them into the 
water. 
 
1.3.3 Disable pirate C2  
Prevent the pirates from effectively coordinating 
their assault by using distraction systems. 
D. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
1. Viable Solutions 
The output from the development of the system architecture provided a list of 25 
possible piracy countermeasures listed below: 
 Razor Wire 
Razor wire is a low-cost and widely used method of creating a defensive barrier. 
It is typically comprised of metal strips with sharp edges or barbs placed throughout its 
length. The principle method of deterrence is by posing a high risk of lacerations to the 
trespasser. often times the metal strips are laid in a spiral and placed under tension so that 




 Electrified Wire 
This defensive barrier is razor wire that has an electrical source provide a pulsed 
high voltage through the wire, potentially stunning an intruder making contact with the 
wire. 
Pepper Spray 
A crew operated aerosol system mounted on the side of a ship, can release up to 
300 gallons of pepper spray onto individuals boarding the ship. 
Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) 
“The Long range acoustic device is a non-lethal anti-piracy device that uses a pain 
inducing sound beam to drive away pirates. The sonic weapon produces high-pitched 
noise that is higher than the tolerance level of an average human being. LRAD has been 
used on few cargo and cruise ships until now” (“18 Anti-Piracy Weapons” 2013). Range: 
10 to 3,000 meters. (http://www.lradx.com/site/content/view/323) 
Anti-Piracy Laser Device (non-lethal) 
“The anti-piracy laser device uses non-lethal laser beam to provide a visual 
warning to pirates and distract them temporarily. The laser device can be used during 
both day and night, and can be easily operated by the ship’s crew” (“18 Anti-Piracy 
Weapons” 2013). Developed by BAE, tests suggest it is effective at a distance of 1.5km. 
Nets-Boat Traps 
“Boat trap is a type of ballistic net which can be used to stop pirates’ boats when 
they come near to a merchant ship. When in water, the net ensnares the propellers of the 
boats that disable the vessel, preventing it from moving forward” (“18 Anti-Piracy 
Weapons” 2013). 
Slippery Foam  
“Slippery foam or Anti-traction material is a non-lethal substance that can be used 
to make the deck or sides of a ship slippery to avoid pirates from climbing it. The highly 
viscous substance substantially reduces traction of anything that comes in contact with it, 
making it difficult to walk or stand” (“18 Anti-Piracy Weapons” 2013). 
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 Foul-Smelling Liquid (Liquid Countermeasure System) 
“An anti-piracy technology by the International Maritime Security Network of 
U.S. involves showering approaching pirates with slick, foul-smelling green liquid, which 
stinks and burns. The burning sensation and the nasty stink caused by the liquid forces 
pirates to jump into the water, thus stopping a possible pirate attack” (“18 Anti-Piracy 
Weapons” 2013). 
Anti-Boarding device (Razor Wire Canister) 
“Anti-boarding device is an anti-piracy method which uses canisters with sharp 
razor wires to prevent pirates from boarding the ship. The wires act as a barrier between 
the pirates and the ship, which thwarts forward movement of pirates” (“18 Anti-Piracy 
Weapons” 2013). 
Compressed Air - Ship Bourne Shore Launcher 
“the Ship Bourne Shore Launcher is a product of a UK based company. The 
Buccaneer Ship Bourne Shore Launcher is a cannon shaped device which uses 
compressed air to fire a variety of projectiles. The power and lethality of the projectiles 
used can vary according to the distance of the pirates from the ship” (“18 Anti-Piracy 
Weapons” 2013) 
P-trap Anti-Piracy Fouling lines 
“[The] P-trap concept is a non-lethal system which helps prevent pirates from 
boarding ships. The system carries thin lines which float at the water level around the 
sides of the vessel. When pirate skiffs/boats come in contact with the lines, the later gets 
entangled with the engine and disable the vessel” (“18 Anti-Piracy Weapons” 2013). 
Effective if run into P-trap, limited range, limited lines. According to FAQs, after four 
attacks, nine P-trap lines were used, there are 20 traps per side, and so multiple waves of 
craft can defeat P-trap. 
Anti-Piracy Curtain  
“Designed by a division of Japan’s NYK group along with hose manufacturer 
Yokoi, the anti-piracy curtain is a unique method to keep pirates from climbing the ships. 
The system consists of a series of hoses which are dangled on the port and starboard sides 
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of the vessel. Sea water is passed through the nozzles at a force of 0.2 Mega Pascal, 
which makes the hoses go in unpredictable whirling motion, generating enough force to 
seriously hurt anyone who gets in the way” (“18 Anti-Piracy Weapons” 2013). 
 Non-lethal/Stun Grenade  
“Stun grenade or flash grenade is a non-lethal anti-piracy device which produces a 
blinding flash of light and loud noise. Stun grenades are used to temporary disorient a 
pirate’s senses without causing any kind of permanent injury” (“18 Anti-Piracy 
Weapons” 2013). 
Dazzle Gun  
“Dazzle guns is a type of laser weapon which uses green light to disorient and 
temporary blind the pirates. The concentrated blast of green light can be used during both 
day and night” (“18 Anti-Piracy Weapons” 2013). 
 Rubber Ball Grenade  
“Rubber ball grenade as a non-lethal weapon sprays rubber bullets on detonation. 
The anti-piracy grenade also produces light and sound which can be used to deter pirates 
from coming towards the ship” (“18 Anti-Piracy Weapons” 2013). 
Active Denial System - Pain Ray  
“Officially known as the Active Denial System (ADS), the Pain Ray is a non-
lethal weapon which transmits a narrow beam of electromagnetic energy to heat the skin 
without causing permanent damage. The wave penetrates beneath the skin which causes 
unbearable burning sensation, forcing pirates to run away or jump overboard” (“18 Anti-
Piracy Weapons” 2013). Operational range and specific time it takes to achieve an effect 
is access restricted.  
 Anti-Piracy Fire Hoses  
“Ship’s fire hoses or special Anti-piracy fire hoses are often used to fight pirates 
trying to board the ships. These high pressure water hoses are extremely powerful and 
effective to fight pirates. Special anti-piracy fire hoses also come with semi-automatic 




Laser Weapon Systems (LaWS) (lethal)  
LaWS is a system based on a design developed by the Navy Research Lab and 
engineers at the Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Dahlgren. Its purpose is not to vaporize enemy ships but to provide a low-cost way for 
the Navy to defend against drones, small boats, light aircraft, and missiles at ranges of 
about a mile. 
Hire Security Personnel to train self-defense/combat 
This countermeasure entails hiring private military contractors to provide 
advanced self-defense techniques and drilling the crew of commercial vessels in the use 
of small arms for self defense 
Agree to Ransom Conditions of Pirates 
This “countermeasure” is included as a baseline to measure other countermeasure 
options against as this is the status-quo solution being used currently. 
Hire Security Team on Board 
Hiring private military contractors to provide security for commercial vessels 
Weapons 
This countermeasure entails providing the crew with small arms and training the 
crew in basic safety measures.  
Smaller Vessels w/ less cargo, therefore lower value target 
This solution would involve changing the composition of shipping fleets to 
emphasize smaller vessels that present less lucrative targets for pirates. 
Change Ship Route 
Travel via a safer but less-efficient route.  
Anti-piracy guardrails 
Plastic/rubber matrix formed over the guardrails of the ship similar to bumpers for 
bowling lanes. Simply put these on after getting into open water, then remove before 
docking. If the boat’s above board height is >8 ft., then no reported instances of failure. 
This will not allow grappling hooks to come onboard and hook onto anything. Developed 
for British merchant ships. 
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2. Trade Study 
A trade study was conducted to reduce the available countermeasures via a 
decision matrix, found in Table 8. The decision matrix scores were based on the 
convention that a rating of one was desired and a rating of five was undesirable. Each 
factor was ranked according to an overall score determined by dividing individual 
countermeasure scores by the theoretical maximum. The top five countermeasures were 
selected for modeling to determine success in preventing pirate attacks.   
Table 8. Decision Matrix Analysis of Potential Countermeasures  
This table shows the decision matrix of 25 possible countermeasures. Each 
countermeasure was ranked according to generated MOPs and assigned a normalized 


























































































































Countermeasure               Score 
Razor Wire 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 86.09% 
Electrified Wire 2 2 3 3 4 2 4 59.13% 
Pepper Spray 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 84.35% 
Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) 3 3 4 5 4 3 2 50.43% 
Anti-Piracy Laser Device (non-lethal) 4 3 4 5 5 3 1 49.57% 
Nets-Boat Traps 5 3 3 3 3 3 1 63.48% 
Slippery Foam 2 2 3 3 2 4 1 75.65% 
Foul Smelling Liquid - Liquid Countermeasure 
System 
3 2 3 3 2 4 3 64.35% 
Anti-Boarding device - Razor Wire Canister 2 2 2 3 4 2 1 74.78% 
Compressed Air - Ship Bourne Shore Launcher 3 4 2 2 2 3 2 71.30% 
P-trap Anti-Piracy Fouling lines 2 1 2 2 4 2 1 81.74% 
Anti-Piracy Curtain 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 81.74% 
Non-lethal/Stun Grenade 2 1 1 2 4 2 4 71.30% 
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Dazzle Gun 3 2 3 3 3 2 1 72.17% 
Rubber Ball Grenade 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 66.96% 
Active Denial System - Pain Ray 3 4 3 5 2 3 1 60.00% 
Anti-Piracy Fire Hoses 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 80.00% 
Laser Weapon Systems (LaWS) (lethal) 4 3 5 5 2 3 3 46.09% 
Hire Security Personnel to train crew in self-
defense/combat 
1 3 2 5 2 4 2 65.22% 
Agree to Ransom Conditions of Pirates 2 2 1 5 3 3 5 53.04% 
Hire Security Team on Board 2 2 2 5 2 3 3 61.74% 
Weapons 2 1 3 3 3 3 5 59.13% 
Smaller Vessels w/ less payload, therefore lower 
value target 
1 3 1 5 4 4 3 58.26% 
Change Ship Route 2 2 1 2 5 4 2 73.04% 
Anti-piracy guardrails 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 79.13% 
 
3. Selected Countermeasures 
Table 9 shows the five piracy countermeasures that were incorporated into the 
model based on their scores in their respective categories in the decision matrix. The two 
passive defense countermeasures are razor wire and P-Traps. For active defense, the 
Anti-Piracy Curtain and Anti-Piracy Fire Hoses scored the highest. The active offense 
countermeasure is the compressed air cannon. 
Table 9. Selected Countermeasures 
This table shows the top five countermeasures from the trade study, which are selected 
for modeling. 
Countermeasure Category Score 
Razor Wire Passive Defense 0.86 
P-Trap Anti-Piracy Passive Defense 0.82 
Anti-Piracy Curtain Active Defense 0.82 
Anti-Piracy Fire Hoses Active Defense 0.80 
Compressed Air Cannon Active offense 0.71 
Razor wire is a low cost and widely used method of creating a defensive barrier. It 
is typically comprised of metal strips with sharp edges or barbs placed throughout its 
length. The principle method of deterrence is by posing a high risk of lacerations to the 
trespasser. often times the metal strips are laid in a spiral and placed under tension so that 
if they are cut, the wire whips and strikes the trespasser. It is designated as a passive 
defense system because once it is set, the system is turned “on.” 
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P-Traps are a passive defensive system primarily distributed by Westmark BV. 
This anti-piracy system is comprised of heavy lines hung of booms mounted on the sides 
of a vessel. It is a close range system as their effectiveness is only as far as the boom 
extends which is currently maxed out at 12 meters. Booms can be mounted so that the 
lines trail from bow to stern on both the port and starboard sides, and additional booms 
can be mounted straight off the stern to provide a rear defense. The primary deterrence 
mechanism is disabling an attacking vessel’s propeller by entangling the heavy lines onto 
them degrading their maneuverability considerably. 
 The anti-piracy Curtain is a countermeasure that uses intense water pressure 
contained in heavy gauge hoses to thwart would be boarders to a vessel. Hung off the 
sides of the vessel, the intense pressure causes the hoses to whip wildly along the flanks 
of the ship. A would-be boarder who decides to climb a vessel equipped with the curtain 
would be subject to blunt force trauma from the turbulent hoses. It was considered an 
active defense because the system would have to be engaged prior to a pirate attack and 
turned off after the attack. 
Anti-piracy Fire Hoses are modelled on UNIFIRE’s anti-pirate water cannons 
system. Typical installations on commercial vessels include six water cannons, three for 
the port and starboard side each. These cannons can be remote operated or automated 
through integration with a radar system. They fire up to 50 liters of water per minute, at a 
pressure of 10 bars, and with an effective range of up to 90 meters. These hoses can be 
used to keep pirates at bay by using the pressure exerted to keep them outside a critical 
range, or, against smaller skiffs, they can be used to quickly fill and sink the attacker’s 
vessel. These are also active defense systems because they must also be engaged prior to 
the pirate attack. 
The Compressed Air Cannon is a pneumatic projectile launcher that can be loaded 
with a wide range of munitions. For the anti-piracy application, the non-lethal projectiles 
were selected. The launchers fire net-like non-lethal projectiles intended to entangle with 
the attacking skiff’s propellers rendering them immobile or severely handicapped with 
respect to maneuverability. Their reported effective range is up to 300 meters. 
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E. MODELING AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
1. Modeled System Configurations  
The full list of selected system configurations can be found in Appendix A. The 
system configurations selected to be simulated were each run 100 times, validated, and 
then run 1000 times. 
2. Results 
For each of the twenty-four system configurations, the DRM was simulated 1000 
times, and the total number of successful runs divided by the number of total runs to 
average the success rate. Four DRM runs contained all mission failures, three DRM runs 
contained all mission successes, and the remainder fell between 0.8 and 0.99. The 
survival percentages for each configuration are listed below in Table 10. 
Table 10. Simulation Results 
This table shows which countermeasures are enabled for each simulation run, and what 
survival rate each system configuration obtained per set of 100 and 1000 runs, 
respectively. 
 


















1 off off On off off 0 0.000  
2 On off On off On 0.99 0.972 
3 On On On off On 0.98 0.996 
4 On On On On off 0.99 0.997 
5 On off On On off 0.92 0.919 
6 off off On On On 0.9 0.864 
7 On On On off off 0.99 0.994 
8 On off off On off 0.87 0.89 
9 off off On On off 0 0.000  
10 On On On On On 1 0.996 
11 On On off off off 0.99 0.994 
12 On off On On On 0.99 0.984 
13 On On off On off 1 0.997 
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14 On off off off off 0.87 0.85 
15 off On On On On 0.99 0.995 
16 On off On off off 0.8 0.085 
17 On On off On On 0.98 0.997 
18 On On off off On 1 0.997 
19 off off On off On 0.92 0.847 
20 off On On off off 0 0.000  
21 On off off off On 0.94 0.973 
22 On off off On On 0.99 0.981 
23 off On On On off 0 0.000  
24 off On On off On 0.98 0.993 
 
3. Model Limitations 
Several assumptions and limitations are identified for the model as it exists today. 
Appendix D lists the areas where it is identified that the model relies upon assumptions 
due to a lack of data available today, or where the data sources are considered less than 
unquestionable. Appendix E lists known areas where the model has significant room for 
improvement and could be focused on in any follow-on effort. 
F. COST ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Each set of simulation runs evaluated a specific system configuration. The five-
year Net Present Value (NPV) system cost for each system configuration was determined 
using the formulas discussed in Section II and the results are listed in Tables 11 through 
16. Not all cost data was obtainable from the countermeasure manufacturers as some 
systems, such as the Compressed Air Cannon, had not been integrated with a commercial 





Table 11. System Configuration Cost 







P-Trap Curtain Fire Hose Compressed 
Air Cannon 
 Sum 
1 $394,889 $0 $0 $0 $0 $394,889 
2 $394,889 $361,871 $0 $0 $802,610 $1,559,370 
3 $394,889 $361,871 $0 $978,831 $802,610 $2,538,200 
4 $394,889 $361,871 $235,280 $978,831 $0 $1,970,871 
5 $394,889 $361,871 $235,280 $0 $0 $992,040 
6 $394,889 $0 $235,280 $0 $802,610 $1,432,779 
7 $394,889 $361,871 $0 $978,831 $0 $1,735,591 
8 $0 $361,871 $235,280 $0 $0 $597,151 
9 $394,889 $0 $235,280 $0 $0 $630,169 
10 $394,889 $361,871 $235,280 $978,831 $802,610 $2,773,480 
11 $0 $361,871 $0 $978,831 $0 $1,340,701 
12 $394,889 $361,871 $235,280 $0 $802,610 $1,794,650 
13 $0 $361,871 $235,280 $978,831 $0 $1,575,981 
14 $0 $361,871 $0 $0 $0 $361,871 
15 $394,889 $0 $235,280 $978,831 $802,610 $2,411,610 
16 $394,889 $361,871 $0 $0 $0 $756,760 
17 $0 $361,871 $235,280 $978,831 $802,610 $2,378,591 
18 $0 $361,871 $0 $978,831 $802,610 $2,143,311 
19 $394,889 $0 $0 $0 $802,610 $1,197,499 
20 $394,889 $0 $0 $978,831 $0 $1,373,720 
21 $0 $361,871 $0 $0 $802,610 $1,164,480 
22 $0 $361,871 $235,280 $0 $802,610 $1,399,760 
23 $394,889 $0 $235,280 $978,831 $0 $1,609,000 



















Table 12. Water Cannon Total Ownership Cost  
This table shows a five-year NPV for the Water Cannon 
NPV Water Cannon Year 
Item 0 1 2 3 4 5 
System Purchase $704,000  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
System Integration $17,600  $0  $0  $0  $0  $17,600  
Consumable 
Purchase 
$1,000  $2,000  $2,000  $4,000  $4,000  $6,000  
Routine 
Maintenance 
$0  $7,680  $7,680  $15,360  $15,360  $23,040  
Unscheduled 
Maintenance 
$0  $5,760  $5,760  $11,520  $11,520  $17,280  
IT Support $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Documentation $20,704  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  
Training $7,135  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Inflation multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.06 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.34 
Subtotal(Current 
Value) 
$750,440  $27,339  $28,980  $49,108  $52,054  $99,393  
Interest Multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.03 1.07 1.1 1.14 1.18 
total (Present Value) $750,440  $26,466  $27,158  $44,550  $45,715  $84,499  
              






Table 13. Compressed Air Launcher total Ownership Cost 
This table shows a five-year NPV for the Compressed Air Launcher 
NPV  Compressed 
Air Launcher 
Year 
Item 0 1 2 3 4 5 
System Purchase $372,900  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
System Integration $211,200  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Consumable 
Purchase 
$5,000  $0  $5,000  $0  $10,000  $0  
Routine 
Maintenance 
$0  $2,560  $2,560  $5,120  $5,120  $7,680  
Unscheduled 
Maintenance 
$0  $8,000  $8,000  $16,000  $16,000  $32,000  
IT Support $1  $1  $2  $3  $4  $5  
Documentation $20,705  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  
Training $7,135  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Inflation multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.06 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.34 
Subtotal(Current 
Value) 
$616,941  $22,168  $29,117  $37,488  $52,363  $66,961  
Interest Multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.03 1.07 1.1 1.14 1.18 
total (Present Value) $616,941  $21,460  $27,287  $34,009  $45,986  $56,928  
              
Net Present Value 






Table 14. P-Trap Total Ownership Cost 
This table shows a five-year NPV for the P-Trap 
NPV P-trap Year 
Item 0 1 2 3 4 5 
System Purchase $62,400 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
System Integration $1,040 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Consumable Purchase $3,000 $6,000 $6,000 $12,000 $12,000 $18,000 
Routine Maintenance $0 $7,680 $7,680 $15,360 $15,360 $23,040 
Unscheduled 
Maintenance 
$0 $7,760 $7,760 $15,520 $15,520 $23,280 
IT Support $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Documentation $20,705 $10,352 $10,352 $10,352 $10,352 $10,352 
Training $7,135 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Inflation multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.06 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.34 
Subtotal(Current 
Value) 
$94,280 $33,700 $35,722 $63,401 $67,205 $99,929 
Interest Multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.03 1.07 1.1 1.14 1.18 
total (Present Value) $94,280 $32,623 $33,476 $57,517 $59,020 $84,955 
              





Table 15. Pirate Curtain Total Ownership Cost 
This table shows a five-year NPV for the Pirate Curtain 
NPV  Pirate Curtain Year 
Item 0 1 2 3 4 5 
System Purchase $88,200  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
System Integration $12,600  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Consumable 
Purchase 
$1,000  $0  $1,000  $0  $2,000  $0  
Routine 
Maintenance 
$0  $2,560  $2,560  $5,120  $5,120  $7,680  
Unscheduled 
Maintenance 
$0  $1,920  $1,920  $3,840  $3,840  $7,680  
IT Support $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Documentation $20,705  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  
Training $7,135  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Inflation multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.06 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.34 
Subtotal(Current 
Value) 
$129,640  $15,722  $17,789  $23,001  $26,906  $34,409  
Interest Multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.03 1.07 1.1 1.14 1.18 
total (Present Value) $129,640  $15,220  $16,671  $20,867  $23,630  $29,253  
              
Net Present Value           $235,280  
 
         
71 
 
Table 16. Razor Wire Total Ownership Cost 
This table shows a five-year NPV for the Razor Wire 
NPV  Razor Wire Year 
Item 0 1 2 3 4 5 
System Purchase $35,700  $35,700  $0  $0  $0  $0  
System Integration $4,200  $4,200  $4,200  $8,400  $8,400  $12,600  
Consumable Purchase $2,000  $4,000  $4,000  $8,000  $8,000  $12,000  
Routine Maintenance $0  $7,680  $7,680  $15,360  $15,360  $23,040  
Unscheduled 
Maintenance 
$0  $7,680  $7,680  $15,360  $15,360  $23,040  
IT Support $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Documentation $20,705  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  $10,352  
Training $7,135  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
Inflation multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.06 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.34 
Subtotal(Current 
Value) 
$69,740  $73,789  $38,104  $68,451  $72,558  $108,440  
Interest Multiplier 
Estimate 
1 1.03 1.07 1.1 1.14 1.18 
total (Present Value) $69,740  $71,432  $35,708  $62,098  $63,721  $92,191  
              
Net Present Value           $394,889  
 
G. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION SCORING 
The modeled system configurations were plotted using the survival data from the 
modeling phase and the five-year cost from the cost analysis and can be found in Figure 
15; the green circles (system configurations 21, 11, and 13) represent the “knee of the 
curve” and the non-dominated solutions that should be looked at closely in selecting a 





Figure 15. Cost vs. Survival Percentage  
This figure depicts cost in $M vs survival percentage of each system configuration. The 
green circles (system configurations 21, 11, and 13) represent the “knee of the curve” 
and the non-dominated solutions that should be looked at closely in selecting a single 











Table 17. Cost and Survival Results 
This table shows the system configurations and the associated cost and survival 
numbers. The green boxes (system configurations 11, 13, and 21) represent the 
“knee of the curve” and the non-dominated solutions that should be looked at 






 5 Year 
Cost 
1 0 $394,889  
2 0.972 $1,559,370  
3 0.996 $2,538,200  
4 0.997 $1,970,871  
5 0.919 $992,040  
6 0.864 $1,432,779  
7 0.994 $1,735,591  
8 0.89 $597,151  
9 0 $630,169  
10 0.996 $2,773,480  
11 0.994 $1,340,701  
12 0.984 $1,794,650  
13 0.997 $1,575,981  
14 0.85 $361,871  
15 0.995 $2,411,610  
16 0.085 $756,760  
17 0.997 $2,378,591  
18 0.997 $2,143,311  
19 0.847 $1,197,499  
20 0 $1,373,720  
21 0.973 $1,164,480  
22 0.981 $1,399,760  
23 0 $1,609,000  












Out of twenty-five available piracy countermeasures, five were selected by 
decision matrix. These five countermeasures were analyzed using a model simulating a 
commercial vessel defending against a pirate boarding attempt mimicking the conditions 
specified in a Design Reference Mission. Twenty-four unique combinations of the 
selected countermeasures were tested in the model. 
After simulations were completed for all of the system configurations, the 
simulation results and cost estimates were imported into Microsoft Excel software to 
determine the effects of the countermeasure interactions. The five-year costs and 
effectiveness were ranked and combined into an overall ranking. 
The results of the simulations and cost analyses showed three configurations that 
maximized cost-effectiveness. Usage of the P-Trap countermeasure combined with the 
Compressed Air Cannon provided a success rate of 97.3% with a five-year cost of 
$1.164M/ship. A slightly more effective system configuration consists of the P-Trap 
countermeasure combined with the Fire Hose, with a success rate of 99.4% and a five 
year cost of $1.341M/ship. Adding the Anti-Piracy Curtain to the P-Trap and Fire Hose 
countermeasures improves the success rate to 99.7%, but increased the system cost to a 

























While multiple system configurations are effective for commercial vessels 
seeking to prevent pirate boarding, the research indicates that the P-Trap, supplemented 
with either Compressed Air Cannons or Fire Hoses is the best option for preventing 
maritime piracy based on the effectiveness, associated costs, ease of use, and the other 
determining factors. Because the Fire Hose countermeasure is a less complicated system 
that requires less crew action during a pirate boarding attempt, it is recommended that a 
combination of P-Traps and Fire Hoses be employed on commercial shipping vessels 
traversing Indonesian waters. 
There are additional factors that were not modeled in this effort, such as levels of 
crew training, or employing countermeasures in a scenario where lookouts have failed to 
notice a pirate attack at range. These are areas for possible future work on boarding-
prevention countermeasures. It should be noted that the P-Trap is a system that can be 
employed well in advance of a pirate attack. This allows the system to protect a vessel 
even in situations where crew lookouts do not notice pirate vessels approaching and 













































1 off off On off off 
2 On off On off On 
3 On On On off On 
4 On On On On off 
5 On off On On off 
6 off off On On On 
7 On On On off off 
8 On off off On off 
9 off off On On off 
10 On On On On On 
11 On On off off off 
12 On off On On On 
13 On On off On off 
14 On off off off off 
15 off On On On On 
16 On off On off off 
17 On On off On On 
18 On On off off On 
19 off off On off On 
20 off On On off off 
21 On off off off On 
22 On off off On On 
23 off On On On off 
24 off On On off On 
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    %Air_Cannon Represents the Air Cannon countermeasure countermeasure. 
    %    the air cannon is a mounted, remote controlled turret that fires one of 
several projectiles to stop pirate skiffs. Selected for the model from among these was 
the net/line option that is fired at pirate craft to ensnare their propellers. 
 
    properties 




        max_magazine_size = 6;  %the maximum number of shots that can be fired without 
the countermeasure being reloaded. 
        time_between_shots = 10;  %Delay, in seconds, that the cannon must wait between 
successive shots. 
        prob_of_hit = 0.5;  %Likelihood of any given shot successfully disabling a pirate 
skiff. 
        time_of_last_shot;  %Tracks the time at which the last shot was fired in order to 
determine when the next shot is eligible to be fired. 
        magazine;  %Tracks how many shots are remaining in the magazine for the current 
run. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Air_Cannon() 
            %Constructor allocates space and pointers for the object as well as 
specifically initializing specific variables. 
            obj.magazine = 0; 
            obj.time_of_last_shot = 0; 
        end 
 
        function obj = activate(obj) 
            %Turns the Air Cannon on by setting its magazine to full. 
            obj.magazine = obj.max_magazine_size; 
        end 
 
        function [obj,skiffs] = act(obj,origin,skiffs,time) 
            %Takes appropriate actions such as movement for the skiff for the given time 
step as well as calling action for all its Pirates. 
 
            %If there is ammunition remaining. 
            if(obj.magazine) 
 
                %If enough time has passed to allow another shot 
                if(time - obj.time_of_last_shot  > obj.time_between_shots) 
 
                    %Build an array of all Skiffs within range of the Air 
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                    %Cannon. 
                    potential_targets = 0; 
                    for i=1:size(skiffs,2) 
                        if norm(skiffs(i).location-origin) < obj.max_range 
                            if potential_targets 
                                potential_targets(size(potential_targets,2)+1) = i; 
                            else 
                                potential_targets(1) = i; 
                            end 
                        end 
                    end 
 
                    %If any Skiffs were found within range. 
                    if(potential_targets) 
 
                        %select a target skiff from the potential targets 
                        target = potential_targets(randi(size(potential_targets,2))); 
 
                        %take the shot 
                        shot = unifrnd(0,1); 
                        if(shot < obj.prob_of_hit) 
                            skiffs(target).status = Skiff_Status.DISABLED; 
                        end 
 
                        %reset timer 
                        obj.time_of_last_shot = time; 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
 








    %Barbed_Wire Represents the Barbed Wire countermeasure countermeasure. Delays Pirates 
in boarding. 
    %    the countermeasure option of wrapping the perimeter of the ship with 
barbed or razor wire is represented by the Barbed Wire class. The Barbed Wire object in 
turn creates a large quantity of Barbed Wire Segment objects which each track the health 
of the barbed wire over a small portion of the Commercial Ship’s circumference. Directly 
adds to the time needed for Pirates to board. 
 
    properties 
        time_to_remove = 120; %Assumed time, in seconds, it would take a single pirate to 
bypass or remove the barbed/razor wire barricade. Update with time in seconds it is 
believed will be needed to bypass a length of razor wire. 
        segment_size = 5; %number of degrees of the ship’s circle that constitute a 
discrete section of razor wire. Psuedo-arbitrary at this time. 
        segments = [Barbed_Wire_Segment(0,179,0),Barbed_Wire_Segment(-1,-180,0)];  %An 
array of the Barbed Wire Segment sections to track each independently. 
    end 
 
    methods 
 
        function obj = Barbed_Wire() 
            %Constructor allocates space and addresses as well as initializing the Barbed 
Wire segments to a disabled state. 
 
            %Initialize Segments to broad sections with no durability. 
            obj.segments = [Barbed_Wire_Segment(0,179,0),Barbed_Wire_Segment(-1,-180,0)]; 
        end 
 
        function obj = Activate(obj) 
            %Reinitializes the Barbed Wire Segment to segment sizes as defined by the 
segment_size property and with appropriate durability. 
 
            %Iterate through all segments on on half of the ship 
            for i=1:(180/obj.segment_size) 
                obj.segments(i) = Barbed_Wire_Segment(obj.segment_size*(i-
1),(obj.segment_size)*i - 1, obj.time_to_remove); 
            end 
            %Iterate through the other side of the ship 
            for j = ((180/obj.segment_size)+1):((180/obj.segment_size)*2) 
                obj.segments(j) = Barbed_Wire_Segment((obj.segment_size*(j-i-1)+1)*(-
1),(obj.segment_size)*(j-i)*(-1) , obj.time_to_remove);%(obj.segment_size)*(i-1)*(-
1),((obj.segment_size)*i - 1)*(-1), obj.time_to_remove); 
            end 
        end 
 
        function durability = is_effective(obj,relative_approach_vector) 





            relative_angle = get_angle([1,0],relative_approach_vector); 
            durability = 0; 
 
            %Find the appropriate Barbed Wire Segment and test its 
            %durability. 
            for i = 1:size(obj.segments,2) 
                if(relative_angle < obj.segments(i).max_angle) && (relative_angle > 
obj.segments(i).min_angle) 
                    durability = obj.segments(i).durability; 
                    break; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
 
        function obj = degrade(obj, time_spent_bypassing, relative_approach_vector) 
            %Reduces the durability in the Barbed Wire Segment at the appropriate area. 
 
            relative_angle = get_angle([1,0],relative_approach_vector); 
 
            %Find appropriate segment and reduce its durability. 
            for i = 1:size(obj.segments,2) 
                if(relative_angle < obj.segments(i).max_angle) && (relative_angle > 
obj.segments(i).min_angle) 
                    obj.segments(i) = obj.segments(i).degrade(time_spent_bypassing); 
                    break; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
 









    %Barbed_Wire_Segment Class that defines a small length of the Barbed Wire 
countermeasure. Used to track health for an arbitrarily small portion of the overall 
barricade. 
    %   the Barbed Wire Segment is a small part of what makes up the entire Barbed Wire 
barricade. Since the barrier can be broken at any particular point, the condition must be 
tracked in segments to show how a breach can happen at one point due to focused efforts. 
 
    properties 
        min_angle; %Defines the starting point along the unit circle of this segment. 
        max_angle; %Defines the ending point along the unit circle of this segment. 
        durability; %Defines how many seconds it would take an individual to bypass or 
remove the segment. Serves as the overall health of the segment. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Barbed_Wire_Segment(min, max, time_to_bypass) 
            %Constructor that allocates memory and addresses as well as initializes 
object variables to the selected parameters. 
 
            obj.min_angle = min; 
            obj.max_angle = max; 
            obj.durability = time_to_bypass; 
        end 
 
        function obj = degrade(obj, time_spent_bypassing) 
            %Takes in the time a Pirate has spent working against the 
            %Segment and updates the Segment’s durability. 
 
            obj.durability = obj.durability - time_spent_bypassing; 
        end 
 
        function remaining_durability = is_functional(obj) 
            %Query to determine if the particular Segment can still hold back a Pirate. 
 
            remaining_durability = 0; 
            if(obj.durability > 0) 
                remaining_durability = obj.durability; 
            end 
        end 
 








    %Com_Ship Class representing the Commercial Ship that is targeted by Pirates within 
the scenario. 
    %    the Commercial Ship class represents the target ship from the DRM within 
the model. It tracks the location, velocity and all other necessary factors associated 
with the ship’s status and actions. The Commercial Ship object contains within itself 
objects representing all of its crew members as well as the objects associated with each 
countermeasure. 
 
    properties 
        move_speed = 10.28; %the maximum movement speed of the Commercial Ship. Based on 
presumed 20 knot max speed. Needs to be verified. representative value based on the 
design scenario 
        location = [0,0];  %Holds the current location of the Commercial Ship within the 
model space. 
        crew;  %A 1 x n array holding Crew objects to represent the Commercial Ship’s 
crew members. 
        bearing;  %A unit vector showing which direction the ship traveled in the 
previous time increment in order to know the direction it is oriented. 
        last_time;  %Tracks when the object was last updated within model time in order 
to scale action progress appropriately. 
        ptrap_on; %Flag indication if the P-Trap is engaged in the current run. 
        ptrap; %Object representing the P-Trap countermeasure within the model. 
        water_cannons_on;  %Flag ingicationg if the Water Cannons are present and engaged 
in the current model run. 
        water_cannons = Water_Cannon(0,0); %1 x n array of objects representing the Water 
Cannons within the model. 
        wire_perimeter = Barbed_Wire(); %Object representing the ship’s Barbed Wire 
countermeasure. 
        pirate_curtain = Curtain(); %Object representing the Pirate Curtain 
countermeasure within the model. 
        air_cannon = Air_Cannon(); %Object representing the Air Cannon countermeasure 
within the model. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Com_Ship(initial_position, crew_status, ptrap_enabled, 
water_cannon_enabled, wire_perimeter_enabled, pirate_curtain_enabled,air_cannon_enabled) 
            %Constructor allocates memory for the object and establishes its pointers as 
well as initializing object properties and constructing the countermeasure objects. 
 
            %Initialize properties 
            obj.location = initial_position; 
            obj.crew = 
[Crew(crew_status(1)),Crew(crew_status(2)),Crew(crew_status(3)),Crew(crew_status(4)),Crew
(crew_status(5)),Crew(crew_status(6)),Crew(crew_status(7)),Crew(crew_status(8))]; %8 is 
an arbitrary max. Fill out DRM to define crew sizes 
            obj.last_time = 0; 
 
            %Construct and initialize countermeasures as defined by the 
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            %input parameter flags. 
            if ptrap_enabled 
                obj.ptrap_on = ptrap_enabled; 
                obj.ptrap = Ptrap(); 
            end 
 
            if water_cannon_enabled 
                obj.water_cannons(1) = Water_Cannon(0,60); 
                obj.water_cannons(2) = Water_Cannon(60,120); 
                obj.water_cannons(3) = Water_Cannon(120,180); 
                obj.water_cannons(4) = Water_Cannon(-60,0); 
                obj.water_cannons(5) = Water_Cannon(-120,-60); 
                obj.water_cannons(6) = Water_Cannon(-180,-120); 
                obj.water_cannons_on = water_cannon_enabled; 
            end 
 
            if wire_perimeter_enabled 
                obj.wire_perimeter = obj.wire_perimeter.Activate(); 
            end 
 
            if pirate_curtain_enabled 
                obj.pirate_curtain = obj.pirate_curtain.activate(); 
            end 
 
            if air_cannon_enabled 
                obj.air_cannon = obj.air_cannon.activate(); 
            end 
        end 
 
        function loc  = getLocation(obj) 
            %Returns the current location of the Commercial Ship within the model space. 
 
            loc = obj.location; 
        end 
 
        function crew_state = getCrewStatus(obj) 
            %Returns the a copy of Crew array 
 
            crew_state = obj.crew; 
        end 
 
        function obj = move(obj, time, military_ship_loc) 
            %Moves the commercial ship closer to the military ship based on the move 
speed is used to scale the magnitude. 
 
            % Calculate the directional vector 
            vector = [military_ship_loc(1)-obj.location(1), military_ship_loc(2)-
obj.location(2)]; 
 
            % Normalize the vector and scale it to both the ship’s speed 
            % and the time increment 
            vector = vector/norm(vector); 
            obj.bearing = vector; 
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            vector = vector * obj.move_speed * (time - obj.last_time); 
 
            % Update x,y and time records 
            obj.location(1) = obj.location(1) + vector(1); 
            obj.location(2) = obj.location(2) + vector(2); 
            obj.last_time = time; 
        end 
 
        function [obj,skiffs] = act(obj, time, skiffs) 
            %Causes the Commercial Ship to act in response to the actions of the Skiffs. 
Includes effects of the Ship countermeasures on the SKiffs. 
 
            %Cause all able Crew members to act. 
            for i = 1:size(obj.crew,2) 
                if((obj.crew(i).status ~= Crew_Status.ABSENT)&&(obj.crew(i).status ~= 
Crew_Status.KILLED)) %This elimination statement may be replaced by switch case within 
Crew 
                    obj.crew(i).act(time,skiffs); 
                end 
            end 
 
            %Cause all active countermeasures to act. 
            if obj.ptrap_on 
               [obj.ptrap,skiffs] = obj.ptrap.ptrap_effect(obj,skiffs); 
            end 
 
            if obj.water_cannons_on 
                for n = 1:6 
                    [obj.water_cannons(n),skiffs] = 
obj.water_cannons(n).Engage(obj,skiffs); 
                end 
            end 
 
            [obj.air_cannon,skiffs] = obj.air_cannon.act(obj.location,skiffs,time); 
        end 









    %Crew Class represents an individual crew member of the targeted commercial ship. 
    %   the Crew class objects represent individual crew members of the targeted 
commercial ship. Initially they were intended for more complex behavior and that may be 
spiraled in during future efforts, but for this model increment the class serves largely 
as a placeholder. 
 
    properties 
        status; %Enumerated indicator of the Crew member’s current status. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Crew(initial_status) 
            %Constructor allocates memory and address pointers as well as initializing 
the status. 
 
            obj.status = initial_status; 
        end 
 
        function obj = act(obj,time,skiffs) 
            %Logic defining how individual crew members would act in each time 
incremement can be inserted here. 
        end 






    %Crew_Status Enumeration of possible states for a Crew object. 
    %   Enumeration class describing the possible states for a Crew member to be in. 
 
    enumeration 
        ABSENT 
        KILLED 
        IDLE 








    %Curtain Represents the Pirate Curtain countermeasure countermeasure. 
    %    the commercially advertised pirate curtain system consists of a 
combination of fire hoses used to flood pirate skiffs and erratically flailing hoses with 
weighted ends that can cause bodily harm to individuals scaling the side of the vessel. 
It was determined that the first component of the system heavily overlapped with the 
Water Cannon already under consideration, but that the flail version represented a unique 
countermeasure option. The Pirate Curtain class then represents the flail portion alone 
of the commercially proposed solution.   the Object monitors the Port and Starboard 
regions of the Commercial Ship and applies a chance to strike any pirate who is in the 
process of attempting to board. If struck, the Pirate is presumed to be permanently 
disabled within the timeline of the scenario. 
 
    properties 
        per_second_probability_of_impacting_pirate = 0.05; %Defines the likelihood in 
each second interval that any pirate within range of the flailing hose would be struck 
solidly. Studies are needed to determine better effectiveness data 
        min_angle = 20; %the start of the angular range over which the Pirate Curtain 
covers one side of the ship. 
        max_angle = 160; %the ending angle of the angular range over which the Pirate 
Curtain covers on side of the ship. 
        curtain_active = 0; %Flag indicatiing if the Pirate Curtain is present and 
active. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Curtain() 
            %Constructor allocates memory and establishes addess pointers. Sets validity 
flag to FALSE until the countermeasure is initialized. 
 
            obj.curtain_active = 0; 
        end 
 
        function obj = activate(obj) 
            %Initializes the Pirate Curtain by setting the validity flag to TRUE. 
 
            obj.curtain_active = 1; 
        end 
 
        function pirate = flail(obj,pirate,approach_vector,time) 
            %Simulates the Pirate Curtain’s flailing action over the time leading up to 
the input time point in order to determine if any Pirates were struck and disable them if 
so. 
 
            approach_angle = get_angle([1,0],approach_vector); 
 
            %Determine if the Pirate is within the Pirate Curtain’s reach 





                cumulative_probability_of_survival = power((1-
obj.per_second_probability_of_impacting_pirate),time - pirate.time_entering_curtain); 
 
                %randomly determine if pirate is struck 
                if(unifrnd(0,1) < cumulative_probability_of_survival) 
                    %pirate survives 
                    pirate.time_entering_curtain = time; 
                else 
                    %pirate is struck and disabled 
                    pirate.status = Pirate_Status.KILLED; 
                end 
            end 
        end 






    %Display Controls all display functionaility for the model system. 
    %   Class object used to implement a model display feature for testing and 
demonstrations of the model. 
 
    properties 
        width; %Defines the window size for the display view. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Display(skiff_start_range) 
            %Constructor establishes memory space and addresses for the Display object. 
 
            obj.width = 2 * skiff_start_range; 
        end 
 
        function obj = refresh(obj,com_ship, mil_ship, skiffs) 
            %Resets all element positions within the view screen 
 
            % set the vertex associated with the commercial ship 
            scatter_x = com_ship.location(1); 
            scatter_y = com_ship.location(2); 
            scatter_size = 20; 
            scatter_color = [0,0,1]; 
 
            % add the vertex associated with the military ship 
            scatter_x(2) = mil_ship.location(1); 
            scatter_y(2) = mil_ship.location(2); 
            scatter_size(2) = 20; 




            % add vertices for all skiffs 
            for i=1:size(skiffs,2) 
                scatter_x(2+i) = skiffs(i).location(1); 
                scatter_y(2+i) = skiffs(i).location(2); 
                scatter_size(2+i) = 10; 
                switch skiffs(i).status 
                    case Skiff_Status.NORMAL 
                        scatter_color(2+i,:) = [1,0,0]; 
                    case Skiff_Status.DISABLED 
                        scatter_color(2+i,:) = [0.3,0.3,0.3]; 
                    case Skiff_Status.REPELLED 
                        scatter_color(2+i,:) = [0.5,0,0]; 
                    otherwise 
                        scatter_color(2+i,:) = [0,0,0]; 
                end 
            end 
 
 
            %display plot 
            scatter(scatter_x,scatter_y,scatter_size,scatter_color); 
 
            %scale plot 
            axis([com_ship.location(1) - obj.width/2, com_ship.location(1) + obj.width/2, 
com_ship.location(2) - obj.width/2, com_ship.location(2) + obj.width/2]); 
 
        end 









    %Domain_Manager controls overall operation of the model. 
    %    the Domain Manager object controls operation of the overall model. It 
creates the other object within itself, initializes them, and then calls their operations 
iteratively to simulate the passage of time. Domain Manager controls the passing of data 
between the other objects (as opposed to a shared memory structure). Domain Manager 
determines when a scenario has concluded based upon established criteria; primarily that 
all pirates have been disabled or that one has boarded. The Domain Manager also controls 
repeated runs of the various system configurations in order to calculate the overall MOE. 
Domain Manager is the connection between the MATLAB user interface and the rest of the 
program, it takes in the scenario configuration and outputs the calculate probability of 
survival for the commercial ship. 
 
    properties 
        time_increment = 1;  %Controls how many seconds pass between each time increment 
of the model. Decrease to improve fidelity and increase to improve run speed. 
        distance_to_aid = 1075000; %Sets the distance between the targeted Commercial 
Ship and the Military Ship that can aid it. Jakarta and Belawan appear to be the two most 
distant naval bases at 2154 km from each other. Halfway between them would be 1075km. 
        skiff_start_range = 8046; %Sets how far away the skiffs are when the scenario 
starts. Based on binocular range described in 
https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20120516151214AAieTBM 
        min_num_skiffs = 6;  %Minimum number of skiffs that will appear in any run of the 
model. 
        max_num_skiffs = 10;  %Maximum number of skiffs that will appear in any run of 
the model. 
        num_skiffs = 0;  %Holds the number of skiffs in the current run of the model. 
        mil_ship  %Mil_Ship class object that represents the Military Ship coming to the 
Commercial Ship’s aid in the scenario. 
        com_ship  %Com_Ship object that represents the targeted Commercial Ship the 
pirates are attempting to overwhelm. 
        skiffs  %A 1 x n array of Skiff objects that represents the swarm of pirate craft 
attacking the COmmercial Ship. 
        time  %Holds the current time, in seconds, since the beggining of the scenario. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Domain_Manager() 
            %Simple constructor for Domain Manager. Allocates space and pointers for all 
class members. 
        end 
 
 
        function results = SingleRun(obj,distance_to_aid, ptrap_enabled, 
water_cannon_enabled,wire_perimeter_enabled,pirate_curtain_enabled,air_cannon_enabled) 
            %Executes a single run of the selected scenario. 
 
            %initialize time 




            %initialize Commercial ship 
            obj.com_ship = Com_Ship([1,1],[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],ptrap_enabled, 
water_cannon_enabled, wire_perimeter_enabled, pirate_curtain_enabled,air_cannon_enabled); 
 
            %initialize Military ship 
            obj.mil_ship = Mil_Ship([1+distance_to_aid,1]); 
 
            %initialize pirate skiffs 
            obj.num_skiffs = randi([obj.min_num_skiffs, obj.max_num_skiffs],1); 
 
            obj.skiffs = Skiff([0,0],[0,0,0,0,0,0,0]); 
            for n = 1:obj.num_skiffs 
                %place each skiff in a random direction from the commercial 
                %ship 
                direction = randn(1,2); 
                direction = direction/norm(direction); 
                displacement = direction * obj.skiff_start_range; 
                obj.skiffs(n) = 
Skiff([obj.com_ship.location(1)+displacement(1),obj.com_ship.location(2)+displacement(2)]
,[1,1,1,1,1,1,1]); %need random position at range and table input if arms 
            end 
 
            %keep track of how many skiffs are still active so the scenario 
            %can be aborted if they are all disabled 
            active_skiff_count = size(obj.skiffs,2); 
 
            %iterate scenario 
            while ((sqrt((obj.com_ship.location(1)-obj.mil_ship.location(1))^2 + 
(obj.com_ship.location(2)-obj.mil_ship.location(2))^2) > ((obj.com_ship.move_speed + 
obj.mil_ship.move_speed)*obj.time_increment))&&(~CountBoarders(obj.skiffs))&&active_skiff
_count) 
                %update time 
                obj.time = obj.time + obj.time_increment; 
 
                %move the commercial ship 
                obj.com_ship = obj.com_ship.move(obj.time, obj.mil_ship.getLocation()); 
 
                %move the military ship 
                obj.mil_ship = obj.mil_ship.move(obj.time, obj.com_ship.getLocation()); 
 
                %All skiffs act 
                for i = 1:obj.num_skiffs 
                    [obj.skiffs(i),obj.com_ship] = 
obj.skiffs(i).act(obj.time,obj.com_ship); 
                end 
 
                %Commercial ship’s crew acts 
                [obj.com_ship,obj.skiffs] = obj.com_ship.act(obj.time,obj.skiffs); 
 
 
                %update number of active skiffs 
                active_skiff_count = 0; 
                for h=1:size(obj.skiffs,2) 
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                    if obj.skiffs(h).status ~= Skiff_Status.DISABLED 
                        active_skiff_count = active_skiff_count + 1; 
                    end 
                end 
 
            end 
 
 
            %Return TRUE if no boarders made it onto the ship, FALSE if any 
            %boarders are on the ship. 
            if (~CountBoarders(obj.skiffs)) 
                results = 1; 
            else 
                results = 0; 
            end 
        end 
 
 
        function results = DemoRun(obj, ptrap_enabled, 
water_cannon_enabled,wire_perimeter_enabled,pirate_curtain_enabled,air_cannon_enabled) 
            %Executes a single run of the model with the specified 
            %parameters and displaying a graphic of the ships and skiffs 
            %moving. 
 
            %the Display object manages the view window to show the 
            %commercial ship, military ship and skiffs as moving dots on a 
            %chart. 
            viewer = Display(obj.skiff_start_range); 
 
            %initialize time 
            obj.time = 0; 
 
            %initialize Commercial ship 
            obj.com_ship = Com_Ship([1,1],[1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1],ptrap_enabled, 
water_cannon_enabled, wire_perimeter_enabled, pirate_curtain_enabled,air_cannon_enabled); 
 
            %initialize Military ship 
            obj.mil_ship = Mil_Ship([1+obj.distance_to_aid,1]); 
 
            %initialize pirate skiffs 
            obj.num_skiffs = randi([obj.min_num_skiffs, obj.max_num_skiffs],1); 
 
            obj.skiffs = Skiff([0,0],[0,0,0,0,0,0,0]); 
            for n = 1:obj.num_skiffs 
                %place each skiff in a random direction from the commercial 
                %ship 
                direction = randn(1,2); 
                direction = direction/norm(direction); 
                displacement = direction * obj.skiff_start_range; 
                obj.skiffs(n) = 
Skiff([obj.com_ship.location(1)+displacement(1),obj.com_ship.location(2)+displacement(2)]
,[1,1,1,1,1,1,1]); %need random position at range and table input if arms 




            %iterate scenario 
            while ((sqrt((obj.com_ship.location(1)-obj.mil_ship.location(1))^2 + 
(obj.com_ship.location(2)-obj.mil_ship.location(2))^2) > ((obj.com_ship.move_speed + 
obj.mil_ship.move_speed)*obj.time_increment))&&(~CountBoarders(obj.skiffs))) 
                %update time 
                obj.time = obj.time + obj.time_increment; 
 
                %move the commercial ship 
                obj.com_ship = obj.com_ship.move(obj.time, obj.mil_ship.getLocation()); 
 
                %move the military ship 
                obj.mil_ship = obj.mil_ship.move(obj.time, obj.com_ship.getLocation()); 
 
                %All skiffs act 
                for i = 1:obj.num_skiffs 
                    [obj.skiffs(i),obj.com_ship] = 
obj.skiffs(i).act(obj.time,obj.com_ship); 
                end 
 
                %Commercial ship’s crew acts 
                [obj.com_ship,obj.skiffs] = obj.com_ship.act(obj.time,obj.skiffs); 
 
                %update plot in each increment 
                viewer = viewer.refresh(obj.com_ship,obj.mil_ship,obj.skiffs); 
                drawnow; 
            end 
 
            %Return TRUE if no boarders made it onto the ship, FALSE if any 
            %boarders are on the ship. 
            if (~CountBoarders(obj.skiffs)) 
                results = 1; 
            else 
                results = 0; 
            end 
        end 
 
 
        function results = Multiple_Trials(obj,num_of_runs, ptrap_enabled, 
water_cannon_enabled,wire_perimeter_enabled,pirate_curtain_enabled,air_cannon_enabled) 
            %Runs the model with the specified parameters the specified 
            %number of times and then returns the proportion of times the 
            %skiff avoided being boarded. 
 
            %Establish a counter to track the number of times the 
            %commercial ship survives. 
            num_of_survivals = 0; 
 
            %Iterate single runs the specified number of times. 
            for i=1:num_of_runs 





            end 
 
            %Calculate the proportion of survivors. 
            results = num_of_survivals/num_of_runs; 
        end 
 




function has_boarders = CountBoarders(skiffs) 
%Helper function that takes in an array of Skiffs and counts the number of 
%Pirates marked as having boarded the ship. 
has_boarders = 0; 
for i = 1:size(skiffs,2) 
    for j = 1:size(skiffs(i).pirates,2) 
        if(skiffs(i).pirates(j).status == Pirate_Status.BOARDED) 
            has_boarders = has_boarders + 1; 
        end 





function [ angle_in_degrees ] = get_angle( a,b ) 
%get_angle Helper function determines the angle in between two directional vectors. 
%   Helper function determines the angle in between two directional vectors. 
 
angle_in_degrees = acosd(dot(a,b)/(norm(a)*norm(b))); 
 
anticlockwise = cross([a,0],[b,0]); 
anticlockwise = anticlockwise(3); 
 
if anticlockwise < 0 








    %Mil_Ship Represents the Military Ship that is coming to the target commercial 
vessel’s aid within the model. 
    %    the Military Ship class generically represents some assisting vessel 
coming to the aid of the Commercial Ship that can stop the pirate attack if it arrives in 
time. The program object actually does very little, merely tracking its own progression. 
If it reaches the Commercial Ship then Domain Manager will end the scenario. 
 
    properties 
        move_speed = 15.55; %the maximum speed at which the Military SHip may move. 
Representative value based on the design scenario; based on advertised speed of Arleigh-
Burke class destroyer 
        location = [0,0];  %the current locatgion of the Military SHip within the model 
space. 
        bearing;  %the direction in which the ship is facing as a vector. 
        last_time;  %the last point, in model time, at which the Military Ship object was 
updated. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Mil_Ship(initial_position) 
            %Constructor allocates memory, sets address pointers and initializes object 
properties to the starting values. 
 
            obj.location = initial_position; 
            obj.last_time = 0; 
        end 
 
        function loc  = getLocation(obj) 
            %Returns the current location of the Military Ship within the %model space. 
 
            loc = obj.location; 
        end 
 
        function obj = move(obj, time, commercial_ship_loc) 
            %Moves the military ship closer to the commercial ship based on the move 
speed is used to scale the magnitude. 
 
            % Calculate the directional vector 
            vector = [commercial_ship_loc(1)-obj.location(1), commercial_ship_loc(2)-
obj.location(2)]; 
 
            % Normalize the vector and scale it to both the ship’s speed 
            % and the time increment 
            vector = vector/norm(vector); 
            obj.bearing = vector; 
            vector = vector * obj.move_speed * (time - obj.last_time); 
 
            % Update x,y and time records 
            obj.location(1) = obj.location(1) + vector(1); 
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            obj.location(2) = obj.location(2) + vector(2); 
            obj.last_time = time; 
        end 






    %Pirate Represents the individual Pirate within the model. 
    %    the Pirate object represents an individual pirate. A Pirate can transition 
primarily between different states and keeps track of the time it should be taking to 
accomplish tasks, such as boarding the side of a Commercial Ship.   Pirate objects are 
created and reside within Skiff objects. The Skiff passes update calls down to the Pirate 




    properties 
        weapon; %Enumeration representing the weapon this Pirate carries. Not used within 
this version of the model. 
        status; %Enumeration representing the current state of this individual Pirate. 
        last_time; %the last time, in model time, that the Pirate object was updated. 
Used to scale actions. 
        task_start; %the time, in model time, that the Pirate’s current task was begun. 
Used to calculate progress to completion. 
        maximum_boarding_distance = 2; %the distance, in meters, that the Pirate must get 
to the Commercial Ship in order to attempt to board it. 
        max_simultaneous_boarders = 2; %the number of Pirates in one skiff who may 
attempt to board the Commercial Ship at the same time. Driven by assumptions about the 
stability of the skiff and the length of its rail. 
        time_to_board = 45;             %the time, in seconds, it is expected to take a 
pirate to board the Commercial Ship in the absence of any countermeasures. Considered a 
strong Assumption 
        time_entering_curtain = 0;  %the model time at which the Pirate entered the 
Pirate Curtain’s region of influence. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Pirate(weapon_setting) 
            %Constructor allocates memory, sets address pointers and sets the status of 
the Pirate. 
 
            obj.weapon = weapon_setting; 
            obj.status = Pirate_Status.ABSENT; 
 
            %If pirate was not entered as absent change the status to idle 
            if obj.weapon ~= Pirate_Status.ABSENT 
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                obj.status = Pirate_Status.IDLE; 
            end 
            obj.last_time = 0; 
        end 
 
 
        function [obj,com_ship] = act(obj, time, skiff, com_ship, approach_vector) 
            %Causes the Pirate to take action based on the Skiffs, Commercial Ship and 
time passed since its last action. 
 
            %Route to the appropriate logic based on the Pirate’s current 
            %status 
            switch obj.status 
                case Pirate_Status.ABSENT 
                    %no effect for absent pirate 
                case Pirate_Status.KILLED 
                    %no effect for dead pirate 
                case Pirate_Status.IDLE 
                    %Pirater assumes an action 
 
                    %if the skiff is near the commercial ship the pirate 
                    %may attempt to board 
                    if(pdist([skiff.location;com_ship.getLocation()]) < 
obj.maximum_boarding_distance) 
                        %presuming that the skiff can only manage to let 
                        %some of it’s passengers mount hooks/ladders at the 
                        %same time it is necessary to count how many are 
                        %already trying and wait till they are done 
                        boarders = 0; 
                        for i = 1:size(skiff.pirates,2) 
                            if (skiff.pirates(i).status == 
Pirate_Status.ATTEMPTING_TO_BOARD) 
                                boarders = boarders + 1; 
                            end 
                        end 
 
                        %if there are not too many pirates attempting to 
                        %board already, this pirate begins to attempt to 
                        %board 
                        if (boarders < obj.max_simultaneous_boarders) 
                            obj.status = Pirate_Status.ATTEMPTING_TO_BOARD; 
                            obj.task_start = time; 
                            obj.time_entering_curtain = time; 
                        end 
                    end 
 
                case Pirate_Status.PILOTING_SKIFF 
                    %Pirate who is piloting cannot take other actions\ 
                case Pirate_Status.ATTEMPTING_TO_BOARD 
                    %Pirates who are in the process of boarding 
 
                    %If the barbed wire is in place the Pirate will spend 
                    %time disabling it. 
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                    if(com_ship.wire_perimeter.is_effective(approach_vector)) 
                        com_ship.wire_perimeter = com_ship.wire_perimeter.degrade(time - 
obj.task_start, approach_vector); 
                        obj.task_start = time; 
                    end 
 
                    %If the Pirate Curtain is active then check to see if 
                    %the Pirate is struck. 
                    if com_ship.pirate_curtain.curtain_active 
                        obj = com_ship.pirate_curtain.flail(obj,approach_vector,time); 
                    end 
 
                    %Check if the pirate has been working at boardinf 
                    %sufficiently long. 
                    if(time - obj.task_start > obj.time_to_board) 
                        obj.status = Pirate_Status.BOARDED; 
                    end 
                case Pirate_Status.BOARDED 
                    %If the Pirate has boarded the Domain Manager will end 
                    %the scenario. 
                otherwise 
                    disp(‘invalid pirate status’); 
            end 
            obj.last_time = time; 
        end 







    %Pirate_Status Enumeration describing the possible states a Pirate may be in. 
    %   Enumeration describing the possible states a Pirate may be in. 
 
    enumeration 
        ABSENT 
        KILLED 
        IDLE 
        SMALL_ARM 
        RPG 
        PILOTING_SKIFF 
        ATTEMPTING_TO_BOARD 
        BOARDED 







    %Ptrap Represents the Pirate Trap countermeasure countermeasure within the model. 
    %    the pirate trap countermeasure is a system of difficult to see lines 
trailed through the water along the sides of and behind the commercial ship in order to 
foul the propellers of pirate craft. Three seperate regions (port, starboard, aft) are 
seperately tracked as they each have their own set of lines. 
 
    properties 
        port_line_count; %Number of lines currently in the port region. 
        starboard_line_count; %Number of lines currently within the starboard region. 
        aft_line_count; %Number of lines currently in the aft region. 
        num_of_lines = 10; %Number of lines all sectors will be initialized with. 
        ptrap_range = 10; %the distance (m) from the Commercial Ship hull that the P-Trap 
lines extend out. 
        port_min_angle = 30; %the starting angle for the port region. 
        port_max_angle = 150; %Ending angle for the port region. 
        starboard_min_angle = -150; %Starting angle for the starboard region. 
        starboard_max_angle = -30; %Ending angle for the starboard region. 
        aft_min_angle = -150; %Starting angle for the aft region. 
        aft_max_angle = 150; %Ending angle for the aft region. 
 
    end 
 
    methods 
 
        function obj = Ptrap() 
            %Constructor allocates memory and sets the starting number of lines into all 
three regions. 
 
            obj.port_line_count = obj.num_of_lines; 
            obj.starboard_line_count = obj.num_of_lines; 
            obj.aft_line_count = obj.num_of_lines; 
        end 
 
        function [obj,skiffs] = ptrap_effect(obj,com_ship,skiffs) 
            %Causes any appropriate effects on the Skiffs to be effected. 
 
            %Check all skiffs to see if they lie within one of the active 
            %regions. 
            for i = 1:size(skiffs,2) 
                %starboard 
                if (obj.starboard_line_count > 0)&& 
(pdist([com_ship.location;skiffs(i).location],’euclidean’) < obj.ptrap_range) && 
(get_angle(com_ship.bearing,skiffs(i).location - com_ship.location) > 
obj.starboard_min_angle) && (get_angle(com_ship.bearing,skiffs(i).location - 
com_ship.location) < obj.starboard_max_angle) 
                   skiffs(i).status = Skiff_Status.DISABLED; 
                   obj.starboard_line_count = obj.starboard_line_count - 1; 
                end 
                %port 
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                if (obj.port_line_count > 0)&& 
(pdist([com_ship.location;skiffs(i).location],’euclidean’) < obj.ptrap_range) && 
(get_angle(com_ship.bearing,skiffs(i).location - com_ship.location) > obj.port_min_angle) 
&& (get_angle(com_ship.bearing,skiffs(i).location - com_ship.location) < 
obj.port_max_angle) 
                   skiffs(i).status = Skiff_Status.DISABLED; 
                   obj.port_line_count = obj.port_line_count - 1; 
                end 
                %aft 
                if (obj.aft_line_count > 0)&& 
(pdist([com_ship.location;skiffs(i).location],’euclidean’) < obj.ptrap_range) && 
((get_angle(com_ship.bearing,skiffs(i).location - com_ship.location) > obj.aft_max_angle) 
|| (get_angle(com_ship.bearing,skiffs(i).location - com_ship.location) < 
obj.aft_min_angle)) 
                   skiffs(i).status = Skiff_Status.DISABLED; 
                   obj.aft_line_count = obj.aft_line_count - 1; 
                end 
            end 
        end 









    %Skiff Represents a single pirate skiff within the model. 
    %    the Skiff class represents the pirate vessels within the model. The object 
tracks the stats, position, and crew of a particular skiff and determines the skiff’s 
next actions when called. Each Skiff object also contains a number of Pirate objects 
(described below) and triggers them to carry out their own actions in each time 
increment. The Skiff objects are all generated and tracked by Domain Manager.   In 
general, Skiffs move directly towards the Commercial Ship in an attempt to allow their 
Pirates to board. Skiffs can be disabled by countermeasures, rendering them immobile. If 
all Skiffs in the scenario are disabled the Domain Manager will end the scenario. 
 
    properties 
        location; %the current location in the model space of the pirate Skiff. 
        pirates; %1 x n array of Pirates aboard this SKiff. 
[pirat1,pirate1,pirate2,...,pirate7] 
        move_speed = 12.86; %Maximum movement speed of the Skiff.  25 knots max speed (in 
meters per second) based upon literature 
        bearing; %Direction the Skiff is currently facing. 
        status; %Current state of the Skiff. 
        last_time; %the model time at which the SKiff was last updated. 
        approach_vector; %Stores the relative direction the skiff is from the commercial 
ship so that when they overlap in the model the skiff can still be treated as having come 
to some particular side of the ship 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Skiff(initial_position,pirate_settings) 
            %Constructor allocates memory for members, initializes properties, and 
generates all Pirate objects. 
 
            obj.location = initial_position; 
            obj.pirates = [Pirate(pirate_settings(1)), Pirate(pirate_settings(2)), 
Pirate(pirate_settings(3)), Pirate(pirate_settings(4)), Pirate(pirate_settings(5)), 
Pirate(pirate_settings(6)), Pirate(pirate_settings(7))]; 
            obj.last_time = 0; 
            obj.status = Skiff_Status.NORMAL; 
        end 
 
        function [obj, com_ship] = act(obj, time, com_ship) 
            %Updates the skiff to include approaching/moving with the ship as well as 
activating any passenger actions. 
 
            %determine if the skiff has a valid pilot 
            has_pilot = false; 
            for i=1:size(obj.pirates,2) 
                if obj.pirates(i).status == Pirate_Status.PILOTING_SKIFF 
                    has_pilot = true; 
                end 
            end 
            % if it does then the skiff moves towards the ship 
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            if has_pilot 
                obj = obj.move(time, com_ship.getLocation()); 
            else 
                %if not look for an idle pirate to take over piloting 
                for j=1:size(obj.pirates,2) 
                    if obj.pirates(j).status == Pirate_Status.IDLE 
                        obj.pirates(j).status = Pirate_Status.PILOTING_SKIFF; 
                        has_pilot = true; 
                        break; 
                    end 
                end 
                %if no idle pirates, pull one from another task 
                if(~has_pilot) 
                    for k = 1:size(obj.pirates,2) 
                        if (obj.pirates(k).status ~= Pirate_Status.ABSENT) && 
(obj.pirates(k).status ~= Pirate_Status.KILLED) 
                            obj.pirates(k).status = Pirate_Status.PILOTING_SKIFF; 
                            has_pilot = true; 
                            break; 
                        end 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
 
            % All Pirates take action 
            for m = 1:size(obj.pirates,2) 
                [obj.pirates(m),com_ship] = obj.pirates(m).act(time, obj, com_ship, 
obj.approach_vector); 
            end 
 
            %update time 
            obj.last_time = time; 
        end 
 
        function obj = move(obj, time, target_loc) 
            %calculates the movement in each time increment. An increment is lost each 
time the pilot must be changed in the current schema. May want to add 
acceleration/deacceleration effects. 
 
            % Calculate the directional vector 
            vector = [target_loc(1)-obj.location(1), target_loc(2)-obj.location(2)]; 
 
            % Normalize the vector and scale it to both the ship’s speed 
            % and the time increment 
            vector = vector/norm(vector); 
            obj.bearing = vector; 
            vector = vector * obj.move_speed * (time - obj.last_time); 
 
            if obj.status == Skiff_Status.NORMAL 
 
                %if distance to commercial ship is greater than the distance 
                %the skiff can move, then move as far as it can; otherwise move 
                %to the ship’s point. 
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                if(pdist([obj.location;target_loc],’euclidean’) > (obj.move_speed * (time 
- obj.last_time))) 
                    % Update x,y and time records 
                    obj.location(1) = obj.location(1) + vector(1); 
                    obj.location(2) = obj.location(2) + vector(2); 
                    obj.approach_vector = -vector; 
                else 
                    obj.location(1) = target_loc(1); 
                    obj.location(2) = target_loc(2); 
                end 
 
            elseif obj.status == Skiff_Status.REPELLED 
                %If the Skiff is being repelled by a countermeasure it 
                %heads in the opposite direction. 
                    obj.location(1) = obj.location(1) - vector(1); 
                    obj.location(2) = obj.location(2) - vector(2); 
                    obj.approach_vector = -vector; 
            end 
 
        end 
 






    %Skiff_Status Enumeration of all possible states for the Skiff. 
    %   Enumeration of all possible states for the Skiff. 
 
    enumeration 
        NORMAL 
        DISABLED 
        REPELLED 









    %Water_Cannon Represents the water cannon countermeasure system within the model. 
    %    the water cannon countermeasure features a remote-controlled water turret 
that operates like a firehose in suppressing and forcing away pirates. The intended use 
is to flood the skiffs, but it was determined that the pirates would seek to avoid this 
eventuality so within the model the Water Cannon object acts to force skiffs out of its 
range. The Water Cannons act on one skiff at a time and cause them to flee the Commercial 
Ship’s proximity. Each of the six Water Cannons is created as its own instance and tracks 
its own tasking. 
 
    properties 
        min_angle; %the starting angle for the region of effect over which the Water 
Cannon can act. 
        max_angle; %the ending angle for the region of effect over which the Water Cannon 
can act. 
        max_range = 85; %the maximum distance from the Commercial Ship in meters at which 
the Water Cannon can reach. 
        target_break_range = 70; %the distance a Skiff must be pushed before the Water 
Cannon will consider alternate targets. 
        current_target; %the array index of the currently targeted Skiff. 
    end 
 
    methods 
        function obj = Water_Cannon(min,max) 
            %COnstructor allocates memory, establishes pointers, and initialized object 
members to starting values. 
 
            obj.min_angle = min; 
            obj.max_angle = max; 
            obj.current_target = 0; 
        end 
 
        function [obj,skiffs] = Engage(obj,com_ship,skiffs) 
            %the Water Cannon takes action; targeting a Skiff and pushing it back. 
 
            %identify targets within range 
            potential_targets = 0; 
            for i = 1:size(skiffs,2) 
                angle =  get_angle(com_ship.bearing,skiffs(i).location - 
com_ship.location); 
                if (angle > obj.min_angle) && (angle < obj.max_angle) && 
(norm(skiffs(i).location - com_ship.location) < obj.max_range) && (skiffs(i).status ~= 
Skiff_Status.DISABLED) 
                   if potential_targets 
                       potential_targets(size(potential_targets,2)+1) = i; 
                   else 
                       potential_targets(1) = i; 
                   end 
                end 




            %if there is not currently a target 
            if (~obj.current_target) 
                %If there are potential targts select one as the current 
                %target. 
                if potential_targets 
                    obj.current_target = obj.Get_Closest(com_ship.location, skiffs, 
potential_targets); 
                end 
 
            elseif ~obj.In_Range(com_ship,skiffs(obj.current_target)) 
                % if the current target is 
                %outside the maximum range then if there are potential targets 
                %set the closest as the new target. 
                %Free the current target if it has moved out of range 
 
                skiffs(obj.current_target).status = Skiff_Status.NORMAL; 
                obj.current_target = 0; 
 
 
            else 
                %cannon repels skiff provided ptrap has not just disabled 
                %it 
                if skiffs(obj.current_target).status ~= Skiff_Status.DISABLED 
                    skiffs(obj.current_target).status = Skiff_Status.REPELLED; 
                end 
 
                %cannon knocks all boarders back 
                for k = 1:size(skiffs(obj.current_target).pirates,2) 
                    if skiffs(obj.current_target).pirates(k).status == 
Pirate_Status.ATTEMPTING_TO_BOARD 
                        skiffs(obj.current_target).pirates(k).status = 
Pirate_Status.IDLE; 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
 
        function nearest_skiff_index = Get_Closest(obj, origin, skiffs, 
allowable_indices) 
            %Determines which skiff out of an array is the closest the selected origin 
point. 
 
            nearest_skiff_yet = 0; 
            nearest_range_yet = 86; 
 
            %Iterate through skiffs and keep track of the nearest one 
            %checked yet. 
            for j = 1:size(allowable_indices,2) 
                if(norm(skiffs(allowable_indices(j)).location - origin) < 
nearest_range_yet) 
                    nearest_skiff_yet = allowable_indices(j); 




                end 
            end 
 
            nearest_skiff_index = nearest_skiff_yet; 
        end 
 
        function in_range = In_Range(obj, com_ship, skiff) 
            %Checks if a particular Skiff is within range of this Water Cannon both in 
regards to distance and angular region. 
 
            in_range = 0; 
            angle =  get_angle(com_ship.bearing,skiff.location - com_ship.location); 
            if (angle > obj.min_angle) && (angle < obj.max_angle) && (norm(skiff.location 
- com_ship.location) < obj.max_range) 
                in_range = 1; 
            end 
        end 
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APPENDIX D. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 








in a chase 
pattern. 
the two major movement 
patterns considered for 
the skiffs was the current 
aim-directly-at-the-ship or 
a more complex aim-
where-the-ship-will-be. 
That is, it would be more 
efficient for the pirates to 
aim at a forward intercept 
point, but this requires 
they be able to accurately 
judge the ships and their 
own relative velocities in 
order to maintain the 
relative angle-off-bearing 
of the target.   
the predictive behavior 
was considered 
challenging to 
accomplish on the seas 
from a small skiff and 
would have driven 
additional complexity 
into the model and so 
was deferred. 
Would result in the 
proportion of pirate skiffs 
approaching from the rear 






1,075 km from 





 Jakarta and Belawan 
appear to be the two 
most distant naval 
bases from each other 
in the region of interest 
(about 2154 km). It is 
likely the pirates would 
try and attack ships at 
the worst place for 
them, which would be 
halfway between the 
two. 
A dramatically shorter 
required distance to travel 
would result in time-delay 
countermeasures (such as 
razor wire) being more 
effective than currently 


















With all countermeasures 
selected for the model 
either not needing active 
control or allowing for 
remote control from 
within the ship, it was 
presumed that the lack of 
crew exposure would 
render pirate weapons 
ineffective prior to 
boarding. 
While the pirates have 
RPGs that could 
potentially cause 
structural damage to 
the ship; they are 
unlikely to fully disable 
or sink the ship as that 
would prevent them 
from profiting. The 
countermeasure 
system emplacements 
should present small 
enough a target that 
attacks against them 
are not a driving factor. 
If the pirates are able to 
fire rockets from skiffs 
accurately enough to 
disable countermeasure 
emplacements then there 
is a significant dynamic to 
the system configurations 
that the model is not 
currently accounting for. 
Assuming accuracy is a 
factor of range the longer 
distance countermeasures 
would be preferred under 
those conditions. 
 
Pirate skiffs are 
first recognized 
as hostile at 1 
mile. 
the scenario begins with 
all pirate skiffs entering 
the recognition range 
simultaneously 
(considered a worst-case). 
This range is defined by 
how far out the ship can 
recognize them as pirates 
at and begin to respond 
to the attack. 
the range is intended 
to represent the 
distance at which the 
pirates can be 
observed by binoculars 
to identify possibly 
armaments or other 
indicators of possible 
hostility.  
Relatively little effect if 
the recognition distance 
is, in fact, greater than 
that used. If the distance 
is shorter however, some 
countermeasures may 
experience a smaller area 







Assumption Explanation Rationale Consequence of Incorrect 
Assumption 
Reference 
the number of 
skiffs in an 
attack ranges 
from 6 to 10. 
the model uses a uniform 
distribution of 6–10 pirate 
skiffs on each scenario. 
 Some countermeasures 
may be susceptible to 
breaking down if 
overwhelmed. In 
particular the P-trap could 





the pirate skiffs 
move at 12.86 
meters per 
second 
 Based on a presumed 
maximum speed of 25 
knots. 
If pirate skiff speeds are in 
fact less than the 
commercial ship speeds 
then there would be 
significant changes in 
which countermeasures 
are preferred as the skiffs 
need only be fended off 
for one pass. If they are 
much faster than 
predicted then ranged 
countermeasures would 
have less time to be in 
effect before the skiff 




Assumption Explanation Rationale Consequence of Incorrect 
Assumption 
Reference 
Skiffs carry 8 
pirates each. 
Each skiff contains 8 
Pirate objects, one of 
which is immediately 
committed to piloting the 
skiff. 
 the only countermeasure 
currently in the model 
that is directly impacted 
by the number of pirates 
on board is the pirate 
curtain system. The 
results for that system are 
likely to change as a result 
of differing numbers of 
pirates per skiff. 
 






the model assumes that 
the razor/barbed wire can 
be placed such that the 
pirates remain within 
range of the pirate curtain 
while trying to bypass the 
wire, but also such that 
the pirate curtain never 
damages the wire. 
there is insufficient 
data on the statistical 
movement patterns of 
the pirate curtain to 
understand the validity 
of this assumption. It is 
possible that there is 
not actually any 
placement where the 
wire would keep the 
pirates within the 
curtain’s range without 
risking damage to the 
wire itself. 
A synergy that the model 
represents between the 
razor wire and pirate 
curtain countermeasures 
would be reversed with 
the two in conflict and 
weakening each other 
instead of supporting. 








vessel moves at 
10.28 meters 
per second. 
 Based on a presumed 
maximum speed of 20 
knots. 
the relative speeds of the 
commercial vessel versus 
the skiffs affect the 
amount of time ranged 
countermeasures have to 
work on the skiffs as they 
approach. A significantly 
higher speed for the 
commercial ship may also 
allow the ship to pull away 
from the skiffs, or 
dramatically shorten the 





vessel moves at 
15.55 meters 
per second. 
 Based on an advertised 
maximum speed of 
Arleigh-Burke class 
destroyer. 
Slower speeds would 
increase the time the 
commercial ship must 
fend for itself; reducing 
the effectiveness of 
countermeasures that 






board the ship 
once their skiff 
is within 2 
meters. 
2 meters is the trigger 
chosen to start the pirate 
boarding actions. 
Based on boarding 
attempts with ladders 
and grappling hooks. 
Presumed based on 
best-guess. 
Little effect for changes 





Assumption Explanation Rationale Consequence of Incorrect 
Assumption 
Reference 
Only 2 pirates 
from a single 
skiff may 
attempt to 
board at any 
given time. 
It was believed that there 
would be some limitation 
on the amount of 
boarding gear (such as 
ladders) that could be fit 
within the skiff. 
Additionally, there are 
constraints to how many 
pirates can congregate 
against the same rail at 
any given time. 
2 was a best 
assumption made with 
scarce data. 
Would decrease the time 
barbed wire delays 
boarders (more people 
cutting at it) and would 
decrease the effectiveness 
of the pirate curtain. 
 







This constant accounts for 
the time needed for an 
unharrassed pirate to 
mount and climb a ladder 
or grappling line. 
This is a strong 
assumption that was 
made in the absence of 
any identified study on 
the subject.   
Would alter the 
effectiveness of the razor 
wire, pirate curtain and 
water cannon 
countermeasures at a 
minimum as well as 
changing how the baseline 
no-countermeasure 
scenario plays out. 
 
the air cannon 
can effectively 
fire 850 meters 
 Based on advertised 
capability. 
Changes would directly 
impact the effectiveness 







Assumption Explanation Rationale Consequence of Incorrect 
Assumption 
Reference 
the air cannon 
can fire six 
shots in any 
given attack. 
Based on the 
presumption of a 6 shot 
clip with the crew being 
precluded from reloading 
it during the attack due to 
gunfire from the skiffs. 
Assumed based on the 
size of the pictured 
device. A relatively 
strong assumption. 
With only six shots the air 
cannon is easily 
overwhelmed by larger 
numbers of skiffs. If the 
true count is significantly 
higher in relation to the 
number of skiffs than the 
air cannon’s effectiveness 
would greatly increase. 
 




This is largely based on a 
notional time needed to 
aim at a new target to 
some extent the physical 
workings of the air 
cannon may require time 
to rebuild air pressure or 
move the next projectile 
into position. 
Actual data is not 
available. Arbitrarily 
assumed. 
Relatively small changes if 
the true delay is within 
several seconds of the 10 
currently used. Much 
larger delays would give 
pirate skiffs the 
opportunity to rush in 




the air cannon 
has a 0.5 
probability of 
disabling a skiff 
with any given 
shot. 
This metric takes into 
account the chance of the 
shot missing entirely and 
of the skiff managing to 
ignore the impediment. 
No true data has been 
generated yet.  0.5 was 
selected to allow the 
model to take into 
account the miss 
chance. 
Performance of the air 
cannon will scale directly 





Assumption Explanation Rationale Consequence of Incorrect 
Assumption 
Reference 






A two-minute delay 
period is associated with 
boarders disabling the 
wire. If multiple boarders 
are at the same segment 
they can work together to 
bypass it faster. 
Two minutes was a 
best assumption. No 
study was found 
showing razor wire 
delay time directly. It is 
believed that the shape 
of the ship hull would 
preclude methods that 
are used to bypass wire 
on fences (i.e., 
throwing a rug over it). 
Alters the effectiveness of 
system configurations 
where the wire is giving 
other countermeasures 








boarder in its 
range is 0.05 
each second. 
Represents the chance 
each second of the flailing 
hose to impact a pirate on 
a ladder/rope in such a 
way as to disable or kill 
them. 
Strong assumption. No 
studies are available 
and the dynamic 
motion of the hose is 
not described 
sufficiently to model in 
detail. 
Directly affects the 
effectiveness of the 
curtain. 
 
the P-Trap can 
stop 10 skiffs in 




the P-Trap has 20 lines 
hanging off its starboard 
and port rails and another 
20 aft of it. Each boat 
passing through the lines 
consumes 2–3 lines 
(worst case of 2). Thus, 
20/2 = 10 skiffs stopped 
per side. 
Based on a 
representative 
configuration selected 
from the supplier’s 
advertised models. 
Would scale the 












the hull of the 
ship. 
Defines the region in with 
which the skiffs will be 
affected by the entangling 
lines. In reality the lines 
off the aft extend further 
(50-1000m) but treating 
the aft equivalently 
simplifies the model 
without much expected 
effect on the analysis. 
the main driver for P-
trap success is an 
adequate number of 
lines deployed. 
Defining the rear range 
as shorter than it is in 
reality in order to 
simplify the model will 
not change how many 
skiffs can be entangled. 





range is 85 
meters. 
 Based upon the 
advertised capability of 
a representative 
system. 
May affect the 









for a new 
target once a 
skiff has been 
forced out to 
70m. 
A defined distance at 
which the operator starts 
searching for a higher 
priority target to focus on. 
Prevents tunnel vision on 
one skiff while others 
approach unimpeded. 
Likely that a tactical 
operator would try to 
prioritize nearby skiffs, 
but at the same time 
that some minimum 
distance must be 
reached for the current 
target for it to be safe 
to switch off them 
momentarily. 
Somewhat arbitrarily 
chosen based off those 
parameters. 
Affects how the cannon 
performs when juggling 
between targets. 
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APPENDIX E. MODEL FUTURE WORK 
 
 Refactor the model code for efficiency. 
o The Model was architected and programmed with a focus on simple, 
comprehensible logic. These attributes were prioritized in order to increase the 
likelihood of the model working correctly and being transferable to other users; 
but at the cost of prolonged run times. There are multiple examples of real-time 
memory allocation or calculation of intermediate values that could have been 
precalculated and hardcoded. Given the prolonged run times of the model in 
operation (around 1 hour for 100 runs), it would likely be worth making the code 
more efficient to increase usability. 
 Utilize crew member tasking tracking. 
o An original intent of the model that fell out of scope in order to a) reduce 
complexity and runtime of the model and b) bring the modeling schedule back to 
the left, was to track what each crew member of the commercial ship was doing 
at any time. This would show limitations of user-controlled countermeasures 
with and without additional crew members. As the model exists today the task 
load on the ship’s crew is not considered, to the perceived benefit of 
countermeasures that require active control. 
 Test and refine implementation of the variable time increment feature of the model. 
o The model was originally designed to allow the user to select what time 
increment should be used in order to tradeoff between fidelity and run time. By 
default the model runs in one second increments. While this philosophy was 
maintained in the design and coding of the model, the feature was not included in 
the debugging and testing of the model due to schedule constraints. This helped 
bring the model schedule back in line with the project’s, but has constrained 
users to the 1 second option. 
 Incorporate pirate psychology/physical limitations. 
o The model currently assumes a mindless dedication by the pirates. They fight to 
the last man and for the entire trip to aid. It is likely that at some point prior to 
those conditions the pirates would abandon their attack. Whether it is running out 
of gas or losing too many skiffs, there are likely some conditions that would 
cause the pirates to “give up” that should be identified and incorporated. 
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